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The central theme of this dissertation is commercial bank behavior. Following
the introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 examines U.S. banks’ choices of for-
eign activities. Chapter 3 analyzes Hungarian commercial banks’ branch net-
work and interest rate choices. Specifically, Chapter 2 relies on a theoretical
model and estimation to examine how banks’ scope of operations and size, and
various host market characteristics, determine banks’ choices of foreign market
entry/exit, and foreign loan/deposit quantities. Applying the Bajari, Benkard,
and Levin (2007) two–step estimation method, the determinants of the optimal
foreign loan and deposit choices are estimated in the first stage. The results (1)
confirm the presence of and correct for significant selection bias arising from the
correlation in banks’ entry and loan volume choices; (2) show different sensitiv-
ities of cross–border and affiliate loans to market and bank traits, and (3) char-
acterize the role of bank scope in bank behavior. In the second stage, forward
simulation is used to estimate banks’ and regulators’ risk aversion parameters,
the fixed foreign market entry costs and scrap (liquidation) values. Results show
that entry costs are higher in inefficient and profitable markets with greater en-
try barriers and stronger government presence in banking. Scrap values move
together with entry costs, and regulators are more risk averse than banks. Reg-
ulatory risk aversion is greater in inefficient markets with stricter regulations
and lower enforcement power. The chapter concludes with simulation exer-
cises that describe the strong discouraging impact of regulations on U.S. banks’
foreign participation.
Chapter 3 examines the dynamic behavior of imperfectly competitive Hun-
garian banks. The chapter consists of a theoretical model and empirical analysis.
A simulation–based estimation method is applied to bank–level data to estimate
the impact of bank and market traits on optimal interest rate and branch net-
work expansion choices. Estimation results confirm the importance of branch
network competition. Furthermore, branch setup cost and scrap value estimates
are high, and strongly positively correlated with each other and with relevant
producer price indices. Chapter 3 concludes with various simulation exercises,
finding a strong impact of competitors’ branch network size on bank behavior.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The central theme of this dissertation is commercial bank behavior. Understand-
ing the determinants of commercial banks’ behavior — more specifically, their
decisions regarding lending, deposit–taking and branch-networking — is cru-
cial from both national and international perspectives. At the national level, de-
cisions of banks regarding the quality and quantity of their services are impor-
tant for consumer welfare as well as for effective bank regulation. At the inter-
national level, the types and magnitudes of cross–country commercial bank ac-
tivities have significant implications for the development prospects of the gen-
erally less prosperous host country, as well as macroeconomic consequences for
the source country. In light of the importance of commercial banking, the pur-
pose of this dissertation is to analyze how banks make their choices. Chapter 2
examines how U.S. banks make decisions about their foreign operations. Chap-
ter 3 studies the competitive behavior of Hungarian commercial banks.
There are numerous empirical studies of bank behavior within particular
national markets, and some studies of the determinants of international cross–
border lending. However, there are several unexamined issues relating to the
role of imperfect competition, the importance of entry barriers as deterrents of
market expansion and regulations. The study of these issues makes this dis-
sertation a contribution. By studying the international activities of U.S. banks,
Chapter 2 of this dissertation contributes by using a dynamic framework for (1)
getting estimates of the entry costs and scrap values, as well as the stringency of
the regulatory environment that banks consider in their decision to expand into
new markets; (2) taking account of the role of imperfect competition in banks’
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location choices; (3) simultaneously examining the determinants of banks’ mar-
ket choices as well as their lending decisions; (4) addressing how banks’ scope
(a measure of the rate at which banks can trade return for risk) affects portfo-
lio decisions in a context where returns are correlated across markets, and (5)
examining the impact of bank and regulatory risk aversion changes on bank be-
havior. Looking at branch network competition in the Hungarian banking con-
text, Chapter 3 contributes by using a dynamic framework to (a) get estimates
of the branch setup costs and scrap values that banks consider in their choices of
branch network size; (b) take account of branch network size as a strategic tool
of monopolistically competitive commercial banks; (c) simultaneously examine
banks’ choices of interest rates and branch network size, and (d) analyze how
competition in branch networks impacts bank profitability and behavior.
1.1 U.S. Commercial Banking on a Global Scale
Chapter 2 focuses on the determinants of the international activities of the largest
U.S. commercial banks. The chapter provides a dynamic estimation of U.S.
banks’ foreign market entry/exit decisions, as well as their foreign loan and
deposit choices. The analysis addresses how banks’ scope of operations (mea-
sured by the lagged Sharpe ratio) and size (measured by total assets), together
with various host market characteristics, determine banks’ optimal choices of
two types: which foreign markets to enter/exit, and the foreign loan/deposit
volumes. These workings of determinants are studied with a dynamic model of
foreign bank activity, where mean–variance utility maximizing banks can reach
foreign markets both via cross–border loans (originating from the U.S.), and
through foreign affiliate operations (after paying the setup costs).
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Forward simulation using the Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) two–step es-
timation method is applied to estimate the model on a panel data set constructed
from 46 countries’ market traits and the Federal Financial Institution Examina-
tion Council (1997-2005)’s Country Exposure Survey quarterly U.S. bank activi-
ties data. In the first stage of the estimation, maximum likelihood methods with
the Heckman selection correction are used to analyze the determinants of the
optimal foreign loan and deposit choices, and banks’s choices of foreign market
entry/exit. The first stage results confirm the importance of correcting for the se-
lection bias in quantity choices emanating from foreign market entry/exit deci-
sions. Furthermore, in both the entry/exit choice and the loan/deposit quantity
choice estimates, bank scope (measured via the lagged Sharpe ratio) has over
three times as great an impact as bank size (measured by total assets). There
are also great differences in the sensitivities of cross-border and affiliate loans to
bank and market traits.
Fixed setup costs and scrap (liquidation) values for a sample of foreign coun-
tries U.S. banks invest in are estimated in the second stage. In order to obtain
estimates of the truly fixed costs that do not depend on banks’ planned scale of
operations, branch network costs and other scale–dependent operating costs
are controlled for. The estimation results suggest that foreign markets with
greater entry costs also have higher scrap values. Furthermore, the estimates
are greater in foreign markets that are less efficient and competitive, more prof-
itable and have greater government presence. In addition, bank regulators tend
to be more risk averse in inefficient markets with stricter regulations and low
prompt regulatory corrective power.
Simulation exercises with the estimated structural parameters are used to
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analyze the impact on U.S. banks’ foreign activities of (1) raising bank risk aver-
sion; (2) increases in the risk aversion of foreign country bank regulators, and
(3) more risk averse U.S. bank regulators. The results suggest that greater bank
and U.S. regulatory risk aversions reduce the value of U.S. banks’ operations,
and discourage bank activity. Greater bank and U.S. regulatory risk aversions
divert U.S. bank assets abroad. On the other hand, more risk averse foreign reg-
ulators reduce the share of foreign assets, and within that, the share of affiliate
loans relative to cross-border loans in banks’ portfolio. These results are rele-
vant for bank regulatory policy considerations. Overall, Chapter 2 contributes
by formulating a dynamic estimation of U.S. commercial banks’ optimal behav-
ior in a global setting.
1.2 Hungarian Banks and Branch Networks
Chapter 3 of this dissertation focuses on the Hungarian commercial banking
market. More specifically, the chapter examines the dynamic behavior of imper-
fectly competitive Hungarian banks. Understanding how Hungarian commer-
cial banks make their choices on interest rates and branch networks is important
for the policy–makers of a country where banks enjoy a large degree of market
power. Chapter 3 presents a model where banks make interest rate and dy-
namic branch network expansion choices in imperfectly competitive markets. In
the Salop–style spatial competition model, monopolistically competitive banks
make simultaneous static interest rate and dynamic branch network size deci-
sions to attract retail clients. In the corporate market, banks choose their interest
rates according to perfect competition. A Markov perfect equilibrium that char-
acterizes banks’ optimal behavior over time is described.
4
After characterizing the optimal behavior of banks, Chapter 3 estimates the
model using bank–level regulatory data on five large commercial banks oper-
ating in Hungary. A version of the Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) method
is applied to the panel data set to estimate banks’ dynamic choices. The data
set covers the period between January 2004 and November 2007. The first
stage of this method yields estimates of the optimal interest rate and branch
network choices as functions of bank and market traits. The detailed data set
makes possible the estimation of interest rate choices by loan and currency type.
The choices of branch network expansion/contraction are estimated with an or-
dered probit formulation. The policy function estimation results strongly con-
firm the importance of branch network competition, and its impact on banks’
interest rate choices. Accordingly, banks are more likely to add new branches,
and offer lower lending and higher deposit rates if competitors operate with
bigger branch networks. Furthermore, banks with more branches charge higher
lending rates and offer lower deposit rates.
The second stage estimation uses the predicted interest rates and branch net-
work sizes to estimate the fixed setup costs and scrap values of branch network
expansion. The estimated per–bank setup cost (with an average of 150 mil-
lion HUF, or nearly 0.75 million USD) is 2.48 times greater than the mean scrap
value (with an average of 110 million HUF, or approximately 0.55 million USD).
These values are high by Hungarian measure, but still much lower than the sur-
vey estimates of 1 to 2 million USD presented in the previous literature for U.S.
commercial banks. Setup costs and scrap values are strongly positively corre-
lated, and move closely with indices of construction costs. Simulation exercises
examine the impact of various parameters on banks’ optimal behavior. Specifi-
cally, the impact of exogenous increases in fixed setup costs on branch network
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size and net interest income is examined, as well as the impact of increases in
per capita consumer income and competitors’ branch network size over time.
These simulations confirm the importance of setup costs and branch network
competition in bank behavior. The results presented in Chapter 3 can have im-
portant policy implications from the perspective of Hungarian bank regulators.
This dissertation gives insight into the determinants of the lending and loca-
tion choices of monopolistically competitive commercial banks in the presence
of diverse activities in imperfectly correlated markets. The results of Chapter 2
of this dissertation provide a more detailed view of U.S. banks’ global activities.
This has welfare as well as regulatory implications. The results in Chapter 3
underline the importance of accounting for branch networks in addition to in-
terest rates as channels of intra-national bank competition. This too is relevant
to forming effective regulations.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DETERMINANTS OF U.S. BANKS’ INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the determinants of U.S. commercial banks’ international activ-
ities is important from the perspectives of both the host countries and banks’
countries of origin. The types and magnitudes of cross–country commercial
bank activities have significant implications for the development prospects of
the generally less prosperous host countries, as well as macroeconomic conse-
quences for the source countries. Foreign banks are often beneficial for the host
economies (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005; Goldberg, 2007). The benefits are most
felt in the host financial sectors, as foreign banks help to improve the efficiency
of host country banks (Bayraktar and Wang, 2005; Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt,
and Huizinga, 2000, 2001; Claessens and Lee, 2002). Since financial sector devel-
opment promotes economic growth, foreign bank entry is likely to be welfare
enhancing (Bayraktar and Wang, 2006). In addition to the development bene-
fits, foreign banks also promote host country financial stability. On one hand,
the presence of foreign banks reduces the probability of banking crises (Asli
Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Min, 1998; Levine, 1999). On the other hand, for-
eign banks are less sensitive to host market fluctuations, and therefore provide
a buffer against financial shocks (Goldberg, 2007).
The internationalization of commercial banking has important consequences
from the perspective of the generally more developed source countries as well.
On one hand, domestic banks’ foreign activities open a potential channel for the
transmission of outside financial shocks. On the other hand, the increasingly
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foreign focus of banks can have significant consequences for the availability of
domestic credit. In fact, the outflow of financial resources from domestic credit
markets has increased to unprecedented levels during the past two decades.
Looking at the United States, foreign assets of U.S. banks amounted to 900 bil-
lion USD by 2002, constituting about 18 percent of total U.S. bank assets and
approximately 10 percent of total global bank lending. The foreign exposure
of U.S. banks has declined in the past decade, mostly due to banks building up
their domestic capital in response to stricter domestic capital rules (Ruud, 2002).
This paper examines the determinants of the international commercial bank-
ing activities of the largest U.S. banks. A thorough understanding of these oper-
ations is greatly complicated by the fact that there are various channels through
which U.S. banks can participate in foreign markets — all with different macroe-
conomic consequences. In addition to domestic operations, U.S. banks can lend
to foreign markets via cross–border loans, originating directly from the U.S.
They can also participate in foreign retail loan and deposit markets by building
foreign affiliates after paying the setup costs. This paper develops a modeling
and dynamic estimation framework to examine how bank size, bank scope and
host market traits (such as expected returns, costs and regulations) affect banks’
choice of these foreign activities.
In a dynamic framework of foreign market entry and exit, greater bank
size (total assets) encourages broader foreign operations by providing more re-
sources for banks to incur the setup costs of foreign market entry. While previ-
ous literature has taken bank size as the sole measure of bank heterogeneity, this
study is unique in that it examines the additional role of bank scope in banks’
international activities. The lagged Sharpe ratio on banks’ global portfolio mea-
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sures bank scope. In a context where returns across markets are correlated, us-
ing the Sharpe ratio as the scope measure allows for the capture of the risk–
return tradeoff improvement that results from entering new markets. Beyond
size and scope, the impacts of market–specific capital and liquidity regulations,
and proportional costs and taxes are also studied in this chapter. In particular,
the question of interest is how these determinants contribute to two types of
bank portfolio decisions: (1) the choice of which foreign markets to participate
in (entry/exit decision), and (2) banks’ choices of the volumes of cross–border
loans, affiliate loans and deposits in these host markets (quantity choices).
This chapter moves beyond the existing literature by presenting a theoretical
model, a contribution towards building the theoretical micro–foundations of a
so–far purely empirical literature. This contribution takes the form of a monop-
olistic competition model where mean–variance utility maximizing banks make
foreign market entry/exit decisions, and cross–border loan, foreign affiliate loan
and deposit choices given their existing size, scope and the host market traits.
Banks’ goal is to weigh expected returns against portfolio risk in a dynamic
framework where entry/exit choices have long-term consequences. The model
focuses on interest rate (or market) risk as the only source of portfolio risk. Mar-
kets are subject to macro shocks in each country. Portfolio risk originates from
the variance caused by fluctuations of the random country-specific interest rates
which are globally correlated. However, macro–shocks move together across
borders — therefore, banks can also rely on potentially variance–reducing cor-
relations. Overall, banks’ goal is to find the optimal risk-return tradeoff on their
global portfolio subject to financing and regulatory constraints in each country.
This chapter also contributes by formulating a dynamic framework for es-
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timating the presented theoretical model. Foreign banking is characterized by
imperfect competition and frequent market entry/exit, which necessitate the
incorporation of dynamics into the analysis. However, previous papers used
static econometric methods, which have only very limited ability to address the
issues at hand. Furthermore, such static methods do not allow for the analysis
of the multi–period effects that policy changes have. The estimation method
used in this chapter is due to Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007). The dynamic
estimation method is applied to a panel data set constructed from 46 host coun-
tries’ market characteristics and the Federal Financial Institution Examination
Council’s Country Exposure Survey quarterly U.S. bank activities data between
1997 and 2005.
In the first stage of the two–step dynamic estimation method, foreign mar-
ket entry/exit probabilities and loan/deposit quantity choices are estimated as
functions of bank size, bank scope and foreign market traits in each period sep-
arately. This first stage is equivalent to getting estimates of the policy functions
based on all the state variables. Furthermore, this first stage allows for the es-
timation of transition probabilities for the endogenous states (such as foreign
presence), as well as the exogenous states (such as bank size). The second stage
of the estimation then uses these first–stage estimates to simulate bank’s op-
timal discounted sum of utilities forward. The second stage is based on two
pillars: the simulation of the values of many alternate paths of action, and the
assertion that banks’ observed actions reflect optimal choices. The second step
consists of getting estimates of structural parameters that ensure the optimality
of banks’ observed actions compared to alternate policy paths. The structural
parameters of interest are banks’ and regulators’ risk aversion parameters, the
country specific entry costs, as well as the scrap values.
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The estimation method is novel in that it examines the determinants of the
major types of banks’ foreign portfolio choices — the entry/exit decision, as
well as the cross–border loan, affiliate loan and deposit quantity choices — si-
multaneously. This is new in the related literature, since so far there have only
been papers (1) examining the type of foreign market participation, treating
cross–border loans and foreign affiliates as the two dichotomous alternatives;
and (2) focusing exclusively on the quantities of foreign loans, and their deter-
minants.
First stage estimates of banks’ entry/exit and loan/deposit quantity choices
show that it is very important to examine these two types of decisions simul-
taneously. Banks’ decisions of market entry/exit are strongly positively corre-
lated with their choices of loan and deposit volumes – therefore they cannot be
examined in isolation. The Heckman selection correction method in fact yields a
correlation coefficient of 0.31 between the unobservable terms in the market en-
try and volume choices. Such strong correlation has major implications for the
estimation of the policy functions. For instance, previous literature — which
did not control for the role of entry barriers — found that bank size has a strong
positive impact on the quantity of foreign affiliate loans banks make. However,
controlling for market selection shows that bank size affects foreign lending sig-
nificantly through the market entry decision as well — large banks are much
more likely to acquire affiliates. The impact of bank size on the choice of affiliate
volumes, conditional on market entry, is much smaller. The strong correlation
of the market presence and loan/deposit quantity equations also indicates the
important role of unobserved entry costs in the allocation of foreign activities
— an issue that the second stage of the estimation addresses.
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Furthermore, the first stage estimates prove that looking at the various types
of foreign activities (cross–border loans, affiliate loans and deposits) one by one
in a unified framework is important. The results below show that bank reg-
ulations, costs and returns have very different effects on cross–border loans,
affiliate loans and deposits. These differences — which would be missed by
grouping all types of foreign bank loans into one category — can have impor-
tant policy consequences. Finally, the policy function estimates show that bank
scope (captured by the Sharpe ratio) has significant explanatory power, in ad-
dition to the well–studied role of bank size. The results indicate that the scope
effect is on average over three times as large as the effect of bank size.
The second step of the estimation relies on using the first–step policy func-
tion estimates to forward–simulate banks’ optimal discounted sum of expected
utility. Structural parameter estimates are obtained so as to ensure the opti-
mality of the observed path of actions in comparison to alternate sub-optimal
paths. In particular, this method yields estimates of banks’ and regulators’ risk
aversion parameters, as well as the fixed entry costs and scrap values. The esti-
mation controls for total operating (variable) costs (including costs proportional
to branch network size). This is important to ensure that the estimates are truly
reflective of the fixed entry costs and scrap values only. Accordingly, the cost
estimates are moderate with a mean of 1.12 for entry costs and 0.56 for scrap
values across countries. The entry cost estimates appear significantly higher
in markets that are inefficient, profitable and have a strong government pres-
ence in banking. Scrap value estimates move closely together with entry costs.
The second stage of the estimation also yields bank and regulatory risk aver-
sion estimates. Getting an estimate of the bank risk aversion parameter is very
important in the mean–variance framework, as it determine the rate at which
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banks trade risk for return, and hence the role of scope. The estimated bank
risk aversion is 0.34, slightly higher than estimates in previous papers. There is
great variation in regulatory risk aversion parameters across foreign markets —
which are generally higher than bank risk aversion with a cross–country aver-
age of 0.52. Regulatory risk aversion appears higher in inefficient markets with
a stricter bank–regulatory environment, which nonetheless have low enforce-
ment power.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides motivation for the
theoretical model’s formulation in the context of related literature. Section 2.3
presents the model and characterizes the optimal foreign portfolio choices (en-
try/exit as well as loan/deposit quantities) as a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Section 2.4 describes the econometric and simulation methods used for the es-
timation, and discusses the data. Section 2.5 presents the estimation results.
Section 2.6 consists of simulation exercises. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Motivation and Related Literature
Banks’ motives for going abroad have several sources. Yannopoulos (1983),
applying the eclectic paradigm of Dunning (1977) to multi–national banks, at-
tributes the development and patterns of international bank activities to own-
ership, locational, and internationalization advantages. Ownership advantages
are bank-specific characteristics, such as bank size and bank scope (degree of
diversification across markets), which enable a particular bank to move be-
yond the domestic border. Locational advantages are host–country specific
traits, such as profitability, regulatory and cost allowances, which attract for-
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eign banks. In a context where international financial market returns are im-
perfectly correlated, banks which are diversified across foreign markets can en-
joy better risk–return tradeoff on their portfolios than their domestic counter-
parts (Hymer, 1976). Internationalization advantage is the portfolio risk–return
tradeoff improvement that multi–national banks can achieve as a result of the
co–movement of international financial market returns. This chapter analyzes
the roles of the ownership, locational and internationalization advantages si-
multaneously in banks’ location and loan/deposit quantity choices.
The inclusion of initial (existing) bank size and bank scope among the deter-
minants of banks’ foreign portfolio choice captures the ownership advantage.
As shown by Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) and others, bank size, bank scope
and efficiency are indeed the most important sources of bank ownership ad-
vantage. Furthermore, bank scope and bank size together sufficiently proxy for
bank efficiency. Bank scope is the rate at which banks trade portfolio risk for
return, and is measured using the lagged Sharpe ratio in this study. Bank scope
is an ownership advantage since it is a bank–specific trait that enables banks
to move beyond the domestic market. Furthermore, bank scope is also an in-
ternationalization advantage as it captures the extent to which banks can take
advantage of the co–movement of returns across markets. An important — so
far neglected — ownership advantage is bank risk aversion, which this analysis
provides structural estimates for.
Initial bank size is defined as the total existing assets of a given bank. Bank
size is an ownership advantage for several reasons. Demsetz and Strahan (1995)
and Goldberg and Cetorelli (2008) show that greater size increases banks’ pro-
pensity to enter new markets. On one hand, greater size enables banks to pay
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the fixed setup costs of expansion (Ursacki and Vertinsky., 1999). On the other
hand, larger banks have an increased need for variance reduction (Pozzolo,
2008). In addition, bank size determines the amount of capitalization parent
banks channel to their affiliates via internal capital markets (Goldberg and Ce-
torelli, 2009) — thereby having an impact on the quantities of banks’ loan and
deposit choices. The analysis of this chapter in unique in that it examines the
roles of bank size and bank scope in banks’ entry/exit and loan/deposit quan-
tity choices simultaneously.
The mean–variance modeling framework employed in this study is in line
with the conclusion of Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) that the most promising
context for examining international bank activities is one with portfolio opti-
mization in the presence of fixed costs. In addition, the mean–variance portfo-
lio choice framework (Markowitz, 1987) is useful because it factors the interna-
tional correlation of market returns into banks’ optimal decisions. Bank scope
(defined as the lagged Sharpe ratio on banks’ global portfolio) captures the ex-
tent to which banks can take advantage of these correlations to obtain a better
risk–return tradeoff. Therefore, it is the mean–variance framework that allows
the examination of bank scope as an internationalization advantage. Further-
more, the mean–variance portfolio choice formulation in this chapter is realis-
tic, since past empirical research has verified that banks consider both portfolio
mean and variance in their foreign activities. With respect to the role of ex-
pected returns (mean) in foreign banking, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996)
and Miller and Parkhe (1998) show that host country financial sector profitabil-
ity is positively correlated with foreign bank operations there. Regarding the
role of portfolio variance, Buch, Driscoll, and Ostergaard (2005) have shown
that greater variance of asset returns is indeed a significant deterrent of banks’
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foreign activities.
The locational advantages of foreign banking are captured by including char-
acteristics of host markets in the set of variables. These are measures of expected
market return indices, competitiveness, entry barriers, regulations and costs.
The importance of locational advantages has been well established in the lit-
erature. Looking at foreign banking activity within the United States, several
studies (Grosse and Goldberg, 1991; Heinkel and Levi, 1992) have identified the
significance of economic and regulatory factors. Papaioannou (2005) confirms
the roles of legal and institutional factors in foreign bank activity. Miller and
Parkhe (1998) claim that more stringent host country regulations deter foreign
bank operations. Beyond regulations and costs, entry restrictions discourage
foreign bank operations by acting as a type of fixed setup cost. Barth, Nolle, and
Rice (1996) argue that host market entry restrictions limit the international flow
of bank assets by eliminating diversification advantages. Buch, Driscoll, and
Ostergaard (2005) show that capital controls in fact significantly reduce banks’
ability to diversify into foreign markets. Furthermore, entry barriers put new
entrants at a disadvantage compared to banks already present in the host mar-
ket (Caves, 1987). This study contributes to the analysis of locational advantages
in two ways. First, the analysis in this chapter presents structural estimates of
each country’s regulator’s risk aversion parameter. Second, banks’ observed be-
havior are used to estimate country–specific fixed entry costs and scrap values.
Foreign bank market competition is assumed to be monopolistically com-
petitive. This choice is motivated by the fact that relationship banking is an
important source of market power for banks. Relationships that banks develop
with customers (Gray and Gray, 1981) provide them with informational capi-
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tal, which translates into differentiated services (relationship banking) and mar-
ket power. Greater market power is likely to affect both banks’ entry/exit and
loan/deposit quantity choices. Indeed, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) show that
banks tend to expand into less competitive foreign markets. In addition to look-
ing at the effect of market power in the foreign market entry choice, this study
contributes to the existing research by examining the role of market power in
banks’ loan/deposit quantity choices as well.
The first type of decision this chapter addresses is banks’ choices of foreign
market entry/exit. Banks’ dynamic foreign market entry/exit decisions shape
the pattern of their global operations. As such, there has been extensive lit-
erature looking at the discrete entry (and more rarely, exit) choices, albeit in
isolation from the volume decisions. In static probit analysis, past research has
established the importance of locational factors (Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia, and Peria,
2006; Ferri and Pozzolo, 2008; Houpt, 1999; Miller and Parkhe, 1998; Nigh, Cho,
and Krishnan, 1986; Sabi, 1988). Empirical studies have found that banks choose
to build foreign affiliates because doing so gives them access to retail markets
(Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005) and hedge them against transfer risk (Cetorelli
and Goldberg, 2009). However, previous literature has neglected the fact that
static analysis is not adequate to analyze banks’ inherently dynamic entry/exit
choices. The analysis in this chapter examines these choices in a dynamic set-
ting.
Careful study of the entry/exit decisions is especially important in light of
recent global banking trends, showing that foreign operations via affiliates has
been on the rise for the past two decades. During the 1990s, the rise in foreign
affiliate banking via cross–border mergers and acquisitions was a global phe-
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nomenon (Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell, 2001). During this period, U.S.
banks’ foreign affiliate assets also increased dramatically, rising from just 7 bil-
lion USD in 1970 to 718 billion USD by 1998. The increasing tendency of multi–
national banks towards affiliate operations has had significant consequences for
the financial structure of many host economies. In some Latin American and
Eastern European countries, over 50 percent of banking assets are now foreign–
controlled (Pozzolo, 2008).
The second type of decision under consideration here is banks’ choice of
the volumes of cross–border loans (generally flowing to sovereigns and multi–
national corporations) and foreign affiliate loans (to retail clients). Both types
have their advantages. On one hand, cross–border loans are advantageous in
that they can draw on parent banks’ capital base, and protect parent banks
from foreign market political risk. Furthermore, Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia, and Peria
(2006) show that banks prefer to make cross–border loans in foreign wholesale
markets, and also to markets where corporate taxes are high. On the other hand,
affiliate lending also has many advantages. Foreign affiliates provide limited li-
ability to parent institutions. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2009) show that operating
via foreign affiliates allows the activation of internal capital markets between
parent banks and affiliates, which insulate banks from liquidity shocks in ei-
ther the home or host countries. Affiliate activities also allow deposit–taking in
foreign markets, which is not possible if lending is via cross–border loans (Saun-
ders and Walter, 1994). Finally, foreign affiliate operations provide banks with
potential tax advantages by delaying income repatriation Scholes and Wolfson
(1992). Data show that U.S. banks have exhibited a striking tendency to move
towards lending via affiliates. The largest U.S. banks’ portfolio share of affiliate
to cross–border loans had risen from 0.78 in 1997 to 1.35 by 2005.
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2.3 Model
2.3.1 Setup and Notation
This section describes the model of banks’ foreign market entry/exit and loan/
deposit quantity choices. Let j = 1...J denote bank j. Each bank j is owned by
shareholders, whose goal is to maximize the lifetime discounted sum of mean–
variance utilities on the bank portfolio. Shareholders make foreign market en-
try/exit, as well as loan/deposit quantity choices at the beginning of each pe-
riod t. There are a total of T periods such that t = 1....T, and I countries such
that i = 1...I. In what follows, the time indices are suppressed. Each bank j
maintains presence in the domestic market, and chooses the composition of its
foreign operations period by period.
Let subscript m index each market bank j participates in. In addition to lend-
ing and taking deposits in the domestic market, there are three markets in each
foreign country i that bank j can engage in. These are the cross–border loan
market, the affiliate loan market and the affiliate deposit market. Banks can
make direct cross–border loans to any foreign country i, at the expense of a fixed
cost Γicb. The cross–border loan market m = cb consists of public and corporate
borrowers. Cross–border loans come out of bank j’s domestic budget, and are
subject to domestic laws and regulations. Banks can also make loans and take
deposits in country i’s retail market m = (al; ad) by building a foreign affiliate in
the country, at the expense of a fixed setup cost Γia. Foreign affiliate operations
are financed out of each affiliate’s separate budget, and are bound by country
i’s laws are regulations. The three available markets per country i are therefore
(al; ad; cb). Since there is no cross–border lending in the domestic market, there
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are a total of 3 − 1 markets available.
The market specific setup costs are constant across banks and over time.
Banks can recover the scrap values Ψim < Γim if they decide to exit market m
in country i. In the beginning of each period, bank j allocates its initial capi-
talization K j across all markets it participates in. Since cross-border loans come
out of the domestic budget, we can index initial allocated capital by country.
Therefore, we have K j =
∑
i Kij.
Banking clients in each market m demand a composite bundle of banking
services from banks of all nationalities. Therefore, banking markets in each
market m are monopolistically competitive, such that  im is the market–specific
loan demand elasticity and ηim is the deposit supply elasticity. Banking clients
in market m demand loans lim and rate rilm, and supply deposits d
i
m at rate ridm
1.
Loan and deposit markets are subject to random and market–specific aggregate
shocks. These shocks are captured by the market–specific composite lending
and deposit rate indices, denoted by αim and βim respectively. These rate indices
are composites of all banks’ rates operating in market m, and are exogenous and
random from bank j’s perspective. Let bars above parameters denote period–
by–period expectations, and V is the known and constant variance–covariance
matrix of return indices2. Then α
i
m
βim
 − N
α¯
i
m
β¯im
;V
 (2.1)
Loan demand and deposit supply functions have the Dixit–Stiglitz type mo-
1Recall that no deposit-taking is possible in the cross–border market.
2These random variables are indices of all bank rates in market m, given by αm =
Am
[∫
n
(rlmn)1−n ∂n
]−1
with m > 1 and βm = Bm
[∫
n
(rdmn)1+ωn ∂n
]
, where Am and Bm are market–
specific constants. The aggregation is over all banks of all nationalities operating in market m.
Note that the U.S. bank takes these market indices as given.
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nopolistically competitive form. Bank shareholders observe the loan demand lim
and deposit supply dim functions:
lim =
(
αim
rilm
)im
rilm = α
i
m(l
i
m)
−1/im (2.2)
dm =
(
rdm
βm
)ηm
rdm = βm(dm)1/ηm (2.3)
For each dollar’s worth of loan lim, the bank must incur a proportional (op-
erational) lending cost of cilm. Similarly, for each dollar’s worth of deposit d
i
m
the bank takes, it must incur a proportional (operational) cost of cidm. Therefore,
the per–dollar net interest income on lim is
(
rilm − cilm
)
, and the per–dollar deposit
expenditure is
(
ridm + c
i
dm
)
.
In addition to loans and deposits, bank j can also borrow from other sources
at known rates. Let ∆im denote non–deposit net borrowing in market m (where
∆icb = 0). The rate r
i
∆m at which the bank can borrow from other sources (such as
the interbank market) increases in the amount of such borrowing, and decreases
in the amount of initial capital that the bank allocates to market m in country i
(never falling below the fixed rate r¯im) :
ri∆m = r¯
i
m
(
1 +
∆im
Kim
)
(2.4)
The state variables, which the bank observes in the beginning of each period
are as follows. First, each bank observes its initial capital K j. Second, the bank
observes the vector of presence indicators P j =
(
P1a; P
1
cb; P
2
a; P
2
cb...; P
I
a; P
I
cb
)
j
. These
presence indicators are defined such that Pim = 1 if the bank already has opera-
tions in country i’s market m at the beginning of the period, and Pm = 0 other-
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wise 3. In addition to size and presence, the bank also brings its existing scope
of operations into the current period, which results from its optimal actions in
the preceding periods. This scope measures the extent to which the bank is able
to trade return for risk, and is captured by the lagged Sharpe ratio S j. Since
loan and deposit return indices are random and correlated across markets, this
scope measure S j captures the extent to which the bank can benefit from any
new entry/exit and investment choice.
The state variables
(
P j; S j
)
depend on bank j’s previous entry/exit and quan-
tity choices. Since it is assumed that profits are re–distributed to shareholders
at the end of each period t, total asset size K j is taken to be exogenous from the
bank’s perspective. Further exogenous and known state variables of the model
are: the vectors of proportional lending and deposit taking costs; the vector of
taxes, capital and liquidity regulations (described below); the joint normal dis-
tribution of the return indices; the distribution of banks’ private shocks, and the
vectors of entry costs and scrap values, denoted by Γ and Ψ, respectively. Let Π
denote the set of all state variables.
Shareholders’ goal is to choose bank j’s portfolio so as to maximize mean–
variance utility over its end–period capital, denoted by K˜ j. Let K˜ij denote the
end–period capital in country i. Due to the random shocks affecting the loan de-
mand and deposit supply functions, the country–specific K˜ij’s are also random
variables. In each country i, K˜ij is composed of the initial market capitalization
Kij, plus net loan interest income, minus deposit and non-deposit borrowing
expenditures, adjusted for the country–specific income tax ti.
Recall that cross-border loans come out of bank j’s domestic operations.
3Note that the subscript a refers to both affiliate loan and deposit markets
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Fixed entry costs and scrap values appear in each affiliate’s end–period capi-
tal. These fixed costs are relevant only if bank j enters or exits market m in the
given period. Let eim j (Π) = 1 denote bank j’s decision to enter market m this pe-
riod, and emj (Π) = −1 is the decision to exit, conditional on all the state variables.
Then the domestic end–period capital is
K˜usj = K
us
j + (1 − tus) · (rla − cla)usj · (lusa j) − (rd + cd) · dusj −
(r∆a · ∆a)usj +
∑
i
(
1 − ti
)
· (rlcb − clcb)ij ·
(
licb j
)
−
∑
i
Γicb
(
1 : eicb j = 1
)
+
∑
i
Υicb
(
1 : eicb j = −1
)
(2.5)
Foreign affiliate income is repatriated to the bank’s domestic headquarters at
the repatriation tax rate of ωi. Then the country i foreign affiliate’s end–period
capital is4
K˜ij = K
i
j +
(
1 − ti
)
·
(
1 − ωi
) 
(rla − cla)ij · lia
− (rd + cd)ij · dij − (r∆a · ∆a)ij
−
Γia
(
1 : eia j = 1
)
+ Υia
(
1 : eia j = −1
)
(2.6)
After all foreign income is repatriated, bank j’s end–period aggregate capital is
K˜ j =
∑
i Kij.
Bank j’s activities are subject to minimum reserve and risk–weighted capital
requirements. Domestic and cross–border lending come out of the domestic
budget, and are therefore bound by domestic (U.S.) regulations. Foreign affiliate
operations are financed out of the budget of each foreign affiliate separately.
Therefore, foreign affiliate operations are bound by each foreign country i’s laws
4The loan revenue and deposit expenditure functions take the forms rilm · lim =
(
αim
)
·
(
lim
)  im−1
 im
and ridm · dim =
(
βim
)
·
(
dim
) ηim+1
ηim respectively.
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and regulations. Bank j can only operate (make loans and take deposits) in
market i if it starts with positive initial capitalization Kij > 0. Let δ
i denotes the
required reserve ratio, and k¯i denote the fixed minimum capital ratio in market
i. The budget constraints on bank j’s domestic and foreign affiliate operations
are
lusa j +
∑
i
licb j ≤ Kusj + ∆usa j + (1 − δus) · dusj (2.7)
lia j ≤ Kij +
(
1 − δi
)
· dij + ∆ia j (2.8)
The bank regulator in country i considers banks’ risk–weighted capitalization in
its capital requirement. Let θi denote country i’s bank regulator’s risk aversion
parameter5, and V i is the variance–covariance matrix of the return indices in
country i alone.6 The risk–weighted capital requirements in the U.S. and coun-
try i are then
E
[
K˜usj
]
− θ
us
2
·
(
K˜us′j V
usK˜usj
)
≥ k¯us ·
lusa j + ∑
i
licb j
 (2.9)
E
[
K˜ij
]
− θ
i
2
·
(
K˜us′j V
usK˜usj
)
≥ k¯i ·
(
lia j
)
(2.10)
The budget and regulatory constraints must hold in each period and each
country. At this point it is useful to introduce time notation t.
Given the state Πt ∈ Π, banks choose actions simultaneously. The two types
of actions are the static loan/deposit quantity choices, and the dynamic foreign
market entry/exit choices. Recall that E j =
(
e j1...e jT
)
denotes bank j’s actions,
and let Et = (e1t...eJt) denote the vector of time t actions. Then E = (E1...EJ).
5This risk aversion parameter denotes the weight that the regulator puts on the market risk
on bank j’s portfolio
6Note that the country–specific variance–covariance matrix of return indices V i is not the
same as the overall variance–covariance matrix on the bank’s portfolio, denoted by V in Equa-
tion (2.15).
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Before choosing its actions, each bank j receives a private shock ν jt, drawn inde-
pendently across banks and over time from a distributionG j (· | Πt) with support
ν j. The private shock might derive from variability in managerial drive for inter-
national portfolio diversification. Let the vector νt = (ν1t, ..., νJt) denote private
shocks of all banks.
Given its private shock, the entry/exit decision vector e j and the set of state
variables Πt, bank j’s utility takes the mean–variance form in each period t:
u
(
e j,Π, ν j
)
t
= E
(
K˜ j
)
t
− λ
2
·
(
K˜′jVK˜ j
)
t
(2.11)
λ is the bank’s constant risk aversion, common across all banks. Letting γ < 1
denote the constant discount factor, we can write bank j’s discounted sum of
utilities over time as:
E
 T∑
t=0
γtu j
(
e j,Π, ν j
)
t
| Πt
 (2.12)
The expectation is over bank j’s private shock in the current period, as well as
future values of the state variables, actions, and private shocks. The final aspect
of the model is the transition between states. The state vector at date t + 1 is
denoted by Πt+1, and is drawn from a probability distribution Λ (Πt+1 | et,Πt).
The dependence of this function on et means that time t entry/exit decisions
affect the future strategic environment. However, not all states are influenced
by past actions.
The analysis of equilibrium behavior focuses on pure strategy Markov perfect
equilibria (MPE). In a MPE, each bank’s behavior depends only on the current
state. Formally, a Markov strategy for bank j is a functionω j: Π×ν j 7→ E j. A pro-
file of Markov strategies is a vector ω = (ω1, . . . , ωJ) where ω : (Π, ν1, . . . , νJ) 7→ E.
If behavior is given by a Markov strategy profileω, bank j’s expected utility over
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time, given a state Π can be written recursively:
V j (Π, ω) = Eν
[
u j
(
ω (Π, ν) ,Πt, ν jt
)
+ γ
∫
V j
(
Π′;ω
)
dΛ
(
Π′ | ω (Π, ν) ,Π) | Π] (2.13)
In (2.13), V j is bank j’s ex ante value function in that it reflects expected prof-
its at the beginning of a period before private shocks are realized. The profile
ω is a Markov perfect equilibrium if, given the opponent profile ω− j, each bank
j prefers its strategy ω j to all alternative Markov strategies ω′j.That is, ω is a
Markov perfect equilibrium if for all banks j, states Π, and Markov strategies ω′j,
V j (Π, ω) ≥ V j
(
Π;ω′j;ω− j
)
(2.14)
It is assumed that all the conditions for the existence of such a MPE are satisfied.
2.3.2 Optimal Choices
Income from lending activities is redistributed to shareholders at the end of each
period. Therefore, bank j’s loan and deposit quantity choices can be analyzed in
a static, period by period setting. Accordingly, in each period t bank j chooses
its loan and deposit quantities to solve
max
lia j;l
i
cb j;d
i
j∆
i
j;K
i
j
u
(
e j,Π, ν j
)
t
= E
(
K˜ j
)
t
− λ
2
·
(
K˜′jVK˜ j
)
t
(2.15)
subject to the budget and regulatory constraints described in Equations (2.7)
through (2.10). Banks make optimal foreign market entry and exit decisions
that solve
max
e1 j,...,eM j
E
 T∑
t=0
γtu j
(
e j,Π, ν j
)
t
| Πt
 (2.16)
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Given the vector of fixed entry costs Γ and scrap values Υ, the optimal mar-
ket entry and exit choices for a bank not in market i are as follows:
Enter if V j
(
aim j = 1; a
i
−mj,Π, ω
)
− Γim ≥ V j
(
aim j = 0; a
i
−mj,Π, ω
)
;
Stay out if otherwise.
(2.17)
For a bank present in market i, the optimal decision rule is:
Exit if V j
(
aim j = −1; ai−mj,Π, ω
)
+ Υim ≥ V j
(
aim j = 0; a
i
−mj,Π, ω
)
;
Stay otherwise.
(2.18)
This concludes the characterization of bank j’s optimal behavior. The next
section describes how to use the structure presented above to estimate the de-
terminants of banks’ optimal decisions.
2.4 Estimation
The purpose of this section is to use the model described above to estimate how
banks’ choices of foreign loans, as well as their market entry/exit decisions de-
pend on bank and market–specific characteristics. The goal is to recover the
model’s structural parameters. These parameters are: the utility function u (·),
the discount factor γ, the transition probabilities Λ (·), the regulatory and bank
risk aversion parameters (λ, θ), the tax rates and return indices (t,R), and the
proportional and fixed costs/scrap values (c,Γ,Υ).
In what follows, it is assumed that the unknown structural parameters are
the risk aversion parameters (λ, θ) and the fixed entry costs/scrap values (Γ,Υ).
Let Θ denote the set of unknown structural parameters such that Θ = (Γ,Υ, λ, θ).
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The goal of the following estimation is to recover these structural parameters
from the model. The estimation strategy follows the Bajari, Benkard, and Levin
(2007) (BBL) method of estimating dynamic games of imperfect competition.
This method can estimate banks’ dynamic strategic choices in this model with-
out having to solve the dynamic optimization problem. The BBL method is
based on two underlying assumptions. First is the assumption that the model
described above represents banks’ true behavior. Second, it is conjectured that
the loan quantity and entry choices observed in the data result from banks’
utility–maximizing actions, given the bank and country–specific characteristics
(the state variables).
The estimation method consists of two parts. The first stage estimates bank
j’s optimal loan, deposit and entry/exit choices (the policy functions) as func-
tions of the set of time t state variables. That is, the first stage estimates:
(l∗; d∗; e∗) jt = f (Πt) (2.19)
where the ∗ superscript denotes observed optimal choices, and Πt is the set
of state variables as of time t. The regression in Equation (2.19) yields policy
function estimates
(
lˆ; dˆ; eˆ
)
for any state variable Πt. Plugging these estimates
into ut (·) produces the period by period value function. Transition probabilities
for the state variables are also needed. The entry/exit estimate eˆ is in fact the
transition probability for bank j’s presence vector P. Transition probabilities of
the exogenous state variables can be estimated using observed data. As a result,
state transition probability function estimates Λˆ (Πt+1 | Πt) are obtained.
The second step uses the policy function estimates
(
lˆ; dˆ; eˆ
)
together with the
transition probability estimates Λˆ (Πt+1 | Πt) to forward-simulate values for the
discounted sum of utilities in (2.12). Recall that these estimates correspond to
28
banks’ optimal choices. Therefore, the resulting simulated value function cor-
responds to the value of banks’ optimal behavior. Importantly, the resulting
simulated values are still functions of the model’s unknown structural parame-
ters, such that Vˆ j (Π;ω;Θ).
Given
(
lˆ; dˆ; eˆ
)
together with Λˆ (Πt+1 | Πt), forward simulation can also be used
to evaluate any other (alternate) bank strategy ω′j, with corresponding simulated
values Vˆ j (Π;ω′;Θ). Based on the assertion that strategy ω j is bank j’s optimal
behavior (described in Equation (2.14) above), the following inequality must
hold at the true values of the structural parameters.
Vˆ j (Π;ω;Θ0) ≥ Vˆ j (Π;ω′;Θ0) (2.20)
The second stage of the estimation then aims to find structural parameter
estimates Θˆ that minimize deviations from Equation (2.20). The detailed pro-
cess of getting the policy function estimates
(
lˆ; dˆ; eˆ
)
and the structural parameter
estimates Θˆ is described in the following subsections.
2.4.1 First Step: Policy Functions and Transition Probabilities
As described above, the first step consists of estimating banks’ policy functions
as functions of the period–specific state variables. The policy functions of in-
terest are the discrete entry/exit choices, and the continuous loan and deposit
quantity choices. Substituting estimates of these policy functions into the utility
function reflects on how the value of bank operations depend on state variables.
Estimation of the loan/deposit quantity choices and the foreign market en-
try/exit decisions can be achieved in one step, via the Heckman selection-bias-cor-
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rected Maximum Likelihood, or MLE estimation method. The advantage of using
a maximum likelihood formulation is that it allows for estimating the policy
functions in one step. Applying the Heckman selection correction method is
important to ensure that the bias arising from correlation of the error terms in
the entry/exit and loan/deposit quantity policy equations is accounted for. The
MLE estimation consists of two equations. On one hand, Equation (2.21) esti-
mates the probability that bank j is present in market i as functions of all the
state variables at time t. Equation (2.22) estimates the loan and deposit quantity
choices as functions of the time t state variables, conditional on bank j being
present in country i at time t. Let Φ (·) denote the CDF of the normal distri-
bution, and Σimt denotes market characteristics at time t. Recall that K jt and S jt
are bank j’s initial capital and scope at time t, respectively. Then the estimable
policy functions are:
Prob
(
Pim jt = 1
)
= Prob
(
κ0 · K jt + κ1 · S jt + κ2 · Σim jt + κ3 · Γim + εim jt > 0
)
Prob
(
Pim jt = 1
)
= Φ
[
κ0 · K jt + κ1 · S jt + κ2 · Σim jt + κ3 · Γim
] (2.21)

lia jt = pia0 · K jt + pia1 · Σia jt + pia2 · S jt + pia3 · θi + uijt
licb jt = picb0 · K jt + picb1 · Σicb jt + picb2 · S jt + picb3 · θi + ψijt
dia jt = pid0 · K jt + pid1 · Σia jt + pid2 · S jt + pid3 · θi + υijt

> 0 if Pijt = 1 (2.22)

lijt = 0
licb jt = picb0 · K jt + picb1 · Σicb jt + picb2 · S jt + picb3 · θi + ψijt
dia jt = 0

if Pijt = 0, (2.23)
In these policy equations, (κ; pia, picb; pia) are vectors of estimable coefficients,
and (u, ψ; ε) are vectors of i.i.d error terms. Estimating this system of equations
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yields coefficient estimates φˆ = (κˆ; pˆia, pˆicb; pˆid). These estimates can be used to
derive predicted optimal entry/exit, loan and deposit quantity choices for any
combination of state variables Π. This is equivalent to obtaining estimates of the
optimal strategies ωˆ (Πt; νt).
Estimation of the transition probabilities of the state variables in Π still re-
mains. Recall from above the eijt = 1 and e
i
jt = −1 denote bank j’s decision to
enter and exit market i at time t, respectively. From Equation (2.21), it is straight-
forward to get transition probability estimates such that
Prob
(
eim jt = 1
)
= Prob
(
Pim jt = 1 | Pim jt−1 = 0
)
= Φ
(
· | Pim jt−1 = 0
)
Prob
(
eim jt = −1
)
= Prob
(
Pim jt = 0 | Pim jt−1 = 1
)
= 1 − Φ
(
· | Pim jt−1 = 1
) (2.24)
Estimates for the exogenous transition probabilities of bank capital K j can also
be obtained from the empirical distribution. The distribution of K j is normal.
Therefore, Monte Carlo simulation with a normal target distribution can simu-
late values for initial capital K.
The next section describes how to get estimates of the unknown structural
parameters Θ using the second step.
2.4.2 Second Step: Structural Parameter Estimates
Recall from above that the unknown structural parameters of interest are Θ =
(Γ,Υ, λ, θ). Estimates Θˆ are obtained from the second step of the estimation
method. The process of recovering these structural parameters goes as follows.
Using the estimated optimal strategies ωˆ (Πt; νt) from the first step:
Vˆ j (Π;ω;Θ) = E
 T∑
t=0
γtu j
(
ωˆ (Πt; νt) ,Πt, ν jt;Θ
)
| Π0 = Π;Θ
 . (2.25)
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Estimate Vˆ j (Π;ω;Θ) of the optimal value function can be obtained by forward–
simulation using the estimated transition probabilities Λˆ (·) as follows. Let N
denote the total number of simulations. Based on the first–stage policy function
estimates, bank j’s corresponding estimated optimal entry/exit decisions and
loan and deposit quantity choices — denoted by
(
lˆ; dˆ; eˆ
)
— are calculated and
plugged into u jt (·). These steps are repeated for each of T periods, using the es-
timated transition probabilities to govern state transitions. Bank j’s discounted
sum of utilities is then averaged over the many simulated paths (n = 1...N) to
yield the optimal value estimate Vˆ j (Π;ω;Θ).
The same process can simulate values for a number of sub–optimal strategy
paths ω′. Let Vˆ j (Π;ω′;Θ) denote the value estimates corresponding to these al-
ternate strategies. The final step is to use the value estimates Vˆ j (Π;ω;Θ) and
Vˆ j (Π;ω′;Θ) to set up inequalities which ensure that the observed bank actions
have the highest value. From Equation (2.20), it follows that
Vˆ j
(
Π;ω j;ω− j;Θ0
)
≥ Vˆ j
(
Π;ω′;ω− j;Θ0
)
(2.26)
The goal is to obtain estimates Θˆ to minimize violations of this set of inequalities.
It is assumed that all conditions ensuring point identification are satisfied. If the
set of inequalities characterizing the optimal choices is large enough and letting
x denote the equilibrium conditions, the following function captures deviations
from the set of inequalities in Equation (2.26):
g
(
x;Θ; φˆ
)
= Vˆ j
(
Π;ω j;ω− j;Θ; φˆ
)
− Vˆ j
(
Π;ω′;ω− j;Θ; φˆ
)
(2.27)
Let gn
(
x;Θ; φˆ
)
be the value of this difference for the n’th simulation, when the
first–stage policy function parameter estimates are φˆ. Let nI denote the number
of sub–optimal policy paths examined (i.e. the number of inequalities) for each
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simulation, and Xk denotes the k’th inequality. Recall that N is the total number
of simulations. Then define
Qn (Θ) =
1
nI
·
nI∑
k=1
(
min
{
g
(
Xk;Θ; φˆ
)
, 0
})2
(2.28)
The best estimates of the structural parameters Θ are such that
Θˆ := argmin
Θ
Qn
(
Θ; φˆ
)
(2.29)
All conditions which ensure that this estimator is consistent and asymptotically
normal are assumed to be satisfied.
The goal of the second stage estimation is to get country–specific estimates
for the fixed entry costs Γ, scrap values Υ and regulatory risk aversion terms θ.
Furthermore, the goal is to get one constant estimate for the bank risk aversion
parameter λ. The following example gives an idea of the estimation process.
If bank j exits country i at time t, the optimal value of this action is simulated.
Then the values of all other exit possibilities are simulated, i.e. the value the bank
would have obtained if it had exited at time t = 0, 1, . . . ,T . For each bank-
country pair and each simulation n, this yields the values of a total of nI = 32
sub–optimal paths. The country i–specific Qijn (·) function for each simulation
n is then calculated, yielding a 32 by 1 vector for each bank. Then variation
across banks and simulation draws are used to obtain country-specific estimates(
Γˆi; Υˆi; θˆi
)
. The bank risk aversion parameter λ enters all countries’ Qijn (·) func-
tion. Thus line search is used to obtain the estimate λˆ from all the Qijn (·) func-
tions jointly.
It is important to take account of the fact that the first–stage policy func-
tions are already functions of the unknown structural parameters that the sec-
ond stage estimates. This difficulty is handled iteratively, as follows. At first,
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the second–stage set of inequalities are solved using the observed loan and de-
posit quantities and entry/exit decisions as inputs (as opposed to first–stage
estimates). The resulting preliminary estimates of the structural parameters are
then used as explanatory variables in the first–stage policy function regressions.
The resulting policy function estimates are then used in the second stage to re–
estimate the structural parameters. The process is repeated until the parameter
estimates converge.
2.4.3 Data
The model’s equations are estimated on a panel data set constructed from quar-
terly data on activities of U.S. banks in 46 foreign markets. The data cover
the period between 1997 Q4 to 2005 Q4, a total of 33 quarters. Data on U.S.
Banks’ foreign claims and liabilities are from the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC) Country Exposure Surveys. This quarterly sur-
vey reports on the foreign activities of U.S. banks with foreign exposure over
30 million USD broken down by host country. Data are reported separately
for three bank size groups: Money Center Banks (large); Other Large Banks
(medium) and All Other Banks (small). Data were collected from these surveys
on U.S. banks’ (1) domestic (U.S.) claims; and for each host country separately:
(2) cross–border claims; (3) foreign affiliate claims, and (4) foreign affiliate lia-
bilities.7 The data are reported on an immediate counter–party basis, i.e. they
do not take account of cross–country risk transfers. For each bank size category,
the reported total claims and liabilities were divided by the number of banks to
obtain the averageloan and deposit quantities. This is necessary since the num-
7The reported survey data were converted into millions of USD, using 2005 Q4 as the base
for inflation adjustment.
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ber and total asset size of reporting banks change significantly over time within
the panel.
With respect to the model parameters, data were collected on bank size (total
assets) from the FFIEC Surveys described above. Data on the market–specific
model parameters for the 46 host markets were gathered from various sources,
including the International Monetary Fund (1997-2005)’s International Finan-
cial Statistics, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1997-
2005)’s Statistics, the Economist Intelligence Unit (1997-2005)’s Country Data
and the World Bank (1997-2005)’s Bank Regulation and Supervision database.
Initial values of the second stage estimation described in the earlier sections
use bank and regulatory risk aversion parameter value estimates from the re-
lated literature. Previous papers have reported banks’ risk aversion parameter
(captured by λ) to be in the 0.20 (Nishiyama, 2007) to 0.29 (Ku¨hn, 2006) range.
For the entry costs, starting values come from regressing total costs on the total
volume of activities for each country. The constant term from this regression
provides a good initial value of the entry cost.
2.5 Estimation Results
2.5.1 Market Entry/Exit Choices and Loan/Deposit Quantities
This section describes the results of the static policy function estimations, which
correspond to the first stage described above. The policy choices of interest are
the affiliate loans, cross–border loans and deposits, as well as the entry and exit
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decisions in each country. The results of the Maximum Likelihood policy func-
tion estimation with the Heckman selection correction are presented in Tables
2.1 and 2.2.
The foreign market entry and exit results in Table 2.1. show that higher ex-
pected returns encourage entry and discourage exit. Furthermore, higher taxes,
costs and stricter foreign market regulations discourage entry and increase the
probability that banks leave the market. Both bank size and bank scope have
strong positive impacts on the probability of entry, and significantly discourage
exit. However, it is interesting to note that the scope effect is more than twice as
large as the size effect. Regulatory risk aversions only have small and insignifi-
cant impacts on the entry/exit choices of banks. Higher entry costs significantly
discourage entry, and greater scrap values increase the probability that banks
exit the market.
The policy function estimates corresponding to the first stage of the estima-
tion give strong confirmation of the importance of the selection bias in banks
foreign activities. The correlation of the error terms of the selection and volume
(quantity) equations is significant and positive with ρ = 0.31∗∗∗(.02). This result
implies that on average, banks lend 32.98 percent more in selected markets, compared
to a random sample of countries. This significant and positive correlation, together
with the fact that most explanatory variables impact both the entry/exit, as well
as the volume choices, implies that the coefficient estimates suffer from serious
upward bias. Specifically, running ordinary least squares regressions on the
loan and deposit volumes (ignoring the selection bias) would lead us to over-
state the impact of model variables. For instance, greater bank size makes banks
more likely to enter a new market, and also increases the loan and deposit vol-
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umes, once there. OLS regression would therefore assign bank size a large coef-
ficient, combining the impacts of size on entry and volume, conditional on entry.
For comparison, the OLS coefficient estimate for the impact of bank size on affil-
iate loan volumes is 1.42, which is 12.7 percent higher than the true coefficient of
1.26 shown in Table 2.1. On average, affiliate loan volume coefficient estimates
suffer from an upward selection bias of 12.72 percent, while the average bias in
deposit coefficients is 12.47 percent.
Table 2.2 shows the bias-corrected coefficient estimates for banks’ choices of
cross–border loan, foreign affiliate loan and deposit volumes. Higher expected
returns encourage banks to increase their loan volumes. Higher deposit financ-
ing costs have strong negative effects on deposit and affiliate loan volumes.
This latter result confirms the importance of deposit–financing for affiliate loans.
Stricter capital regulations have significant negative impacts on all foreign ac-
tivities, with the strongest discouraging effect on affiliate loans. As expected,
more competitive loan markets tend to increase loan volumes. It is surprising
that deposit volume decreases as banks face more elastic deposit supply curves.
Both bank size and bank scope have strong positive impacts on loan and deposit
volumes. It is interesting that bank scope has over three times as large an impact
as bank size. This difference is most expressed for cross–border loan volumes,
where the scope effect is over eight times the size of the bank size effect.
In what follows, the transition probabilities for the presence vector P are
constructed using coefficient estimates from Table 2.1. The paths for bank asset
size K j are constructed using Monte Carlo draws from the empirical normal
distribution with the following bank size–specific moments. For small banks,
the empirical distribution is characterized by N (10, 0.07). For the medium-size
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Table 2.1: Foreign Market Entry & Exit Probabilities: Elasticities.
Explanatory Variables Entry Probability Exit Probability
Exp Affil Loan Rate 0.86∗(.49) −0.03∗(.02)
Exp Deposit Rate −0.32 (1.01) 0.01 (.04)
Income Tax Rate −2.57∗∗∗(.49) 0.10∗∗∗(.02)
Lending Cost −0.08∗∗(0.04) 0.01∗∗(.00)
Minimum Capital Ratio −1.44∗∗∗(.31) 0.05∗∗∗(.01)
Required Reserve Ratio −0.01 (.04) 0.01 (.00)
Lagged Bank Size 0.73∗∗∗(.04) −0.03∗∗∗(.00)
Affil Loan Demand Elast 0.28∗∗∗(.05) −0.01∗(.00)
Deposit Supply Elast −0.08∗∗(.04) 0.01∗∗(.00)
Lagged Sharpe Ratio 1.70∗∗(.78) −0.06∗∗(.03)
Regulatory Risk Aversion −0.01 (.05) 0.01 (.00)
Fixed Entry Cost −0.20∗∗(.09) 0.01∗∗(.00)
Fixed Scrap Value 0.06∗(.04) 0.01∗∗∗(.00)
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Table 2.2: Loan & Deposit Quantity Choices: Elasticities.
Explanatory Variables CB Loan Affil. Loan Deposit
Exp Affil Loan Rate 2.80∗∗∗(.72) 1.37∗∗∗(.37) 0.34 (0.34)
Exp Deposit Rate 0.05∗∗(.02) −3.35∗∗∗(0.63) −3.55∗∗∗(.59)
Income Tax Rate −1.60∗∗∗(.29) −1.66∗∗∗(.13) 1.66∗∗∗(.13)
Lending Cost −0.11∗∗∗(.03) −0.41∗∗∗(0.05) −2.08 (4.02)
Deposit Cost −0.73 (0.74) −2.80 (3.81) −0.25∗∗∗(.05)
Minimum Capital Ratio −0.72∗∗∗(0.31) −0.91∗∗∗(.30) −0.04 (.31)
Required Reserve Ratio −0.27∗∗∗(.02) 0.51∗∗∗(.07) 0.22∗∗∗(.06)
Lagged Bank Size 0.81∗∗∗(.05) 1.26∗∗∗(.13) 1.25∗∗∗(.14)
Affil Loan Demand Elast 0.20∗∗∗(.08) 0.12∗∗∗(.03) 0.04 (.03)
Deposit Supply Elast −0.48∗∗∗(.05) −0.13∗∗∗(.03) −0.04∗(.03)
Lagged Sharpe Ratio 6.53∗∗∗(1.04) 3.30∗(2.00) 3.91∗∗(2.03)
Regulatory Risk Aversion 0.38∗∗∗(.04) −0.17∗∗∗(.06) −0.04 (.07)
category, the distribution is N (10.8, 0.17), and for large banks it is N (13.7, 0.12).
2.5.2 Risk Aversion, Market Entry Costs and Scrap Values
This subsection describes the estimation results for the remaining structural pa-
rameters of the model. These parameters are: banks’ constant risk aversion
parameter λ (common across all banks), the country–specific regulatory risk
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aversion parameters θi, and the country–specific entry costs Γi and scrap val-
ues Υi (which are common across banks and constant over time). The estimates
presented in the following tables result from the second stage of the estimation.
It is important to emphasize that the estimation aims to capture entry costs
and scrap values that are fixed — i.e. fundamentally independent of the scope
and scale of banks’ activities in each market. However, costs associated with
branch network building are inherently proportional to the scale of banks’ ac-
tivities. Therefore, proportional total operating costs (including branch network costs)
are subtracted from interest revenue, in order to make the fixed cost estimates
scale–independent. The estimate for the bank risk aversion parameter is λ =
0.34∗∗∗(.00). Table 2.3 presents the fixed entry cost, scrap value and regulatory
risk aversion parameter estimates for each country in the sample, and Table 2.4
examines how estimates correlate with economic and regulatory measures.
As shown in Table 2.5, scale–independent entry costs and scrap values are
moderate with averages of 1.12 and 0.56 million USD, respectively. Entry costs
and scrap values show clear regional patterns. Table 2.3 shows that entry costs
appear to be the highest in the Eastern European countries — notably in Hun-
gary, the Czech Republic and Russia. These costs are also above average in the
South–East Asian economies, and appear low in most European countries and
the rest of the developed world. The scrap values are consistently lower than
the entry cost estimates, as expected. Scrap values are positively correlated with
entry costs in the OECD states. In developing countries, however, higher en-
try costs are accompanied by average scrap values. Scrap values are generally
higher in markets where market exit was observed, highlighting the positive re-
lationship between scrap values and market exit (also documented in Table 2.1).
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Table 2.3 also presents the estimated regulatory risk aversion parameters. Table
2.5 shows that with a mean risk aversion parameter estimate of 0.52, regulators
are generally more risk averse than banks. Regulatory risk aversion estimates
are the highest in the South American states, while European and North Amer-
ican regulators appear to have risk aversions below average.
Table 2.3 shows that for the South American countries in the sample, vari-
ation in the simulated data was not sufficient to provide entry cost estimates.
The forward simulation was successful in getting estimates for most countries’
regulatory risk aversion and scrap values.
Table 2.3: Estimates of Entry Costs, Scrap Values (Millions of 2004 Q4
USD) and Risk Aversions.
Country Entry Cost Scrap Value Reg. Risk Aversion
Argentina − 0.94∗∗∗(.03) 1.19∗∗∗(0.29)
Australia 0.87∗∗∗(.03) 0.09∗∗∗(.01) 0.31∗∗∗(.11)
Austria 0.29∗∗∗(.01) − 0.35∗∗∗(.06)
Belgium 0.77∗∗∗(.10) 0.44∗(.23) 0.25∗∗(.14)
Brazil − 1.29∗∗∗(.42) 0.40(.43)
Bulgaria 0.70∗∗∗(.03) 0.60∗∗∗(.02) 0.78∗∗∗(.18)
Canada 0.85∗∗∗(.10) 0.31(.57) 0.24(.41)
Chile − 0.79(.74) 0.70∗∗∗(.22)
China 0.43∗∗∗(.03) 0.04(.03) 0.75(.56)
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Table 2.3: (Continued)
Country Entry Cost Scrap Value Reg. Risk Aversion
Columbia − 0.41∗∗∗(.01) 0.79(.71)
Czech Rep. 4.23∗∗∗(.10) 0.64∗∗∗(.06) 0.01∗∗∗(.00)
Denmark 0.90∗∗∗(.03) − 0.51∗∗∗(.06)
Finland 0.93∗∗∗(.03) 0.12∗∗∗(.01) 0.50∗∗∗(.06)
France 0.85∗∗∗(.05) 0.77∗∗∗(.02) 0.70∗∗∗(.14)
Germany 1.12∗∗∗(.08) 0.11∗∗∗(.02) 0.43∗∗∗(.12)
Greece − 0.88∗∗∗(.14) 0.52∗(.30)
Hungary 2.05∗∗∗(.16) 0.65∗∗∗(.02) 0.03(.24)
Iceland − 1.60∗∗∗(.08) 0.59(.63)
India 1.59∗∗∗(.17) 1.20∗∗∗(.14) 0.20∗∗∗(.07)
Indonesia − 1.12∗∗∗(.24) 0.42∗(.28)
Ireland 0.93∗∗∗(.04) 0.26∗∗∗(.01) 0.45∗∗∗(.06)
Israel − 0.71∗∗∗(.04) 0.49(.58)
Italy 0.87∗∗∗(.03) 0.83∗∗∗(.03) 0.52∗∗∗(.06)
Japan 0.94∗∗∗(0.08) 0.13∗∗∗(.03) 0.40∗∗∗(.12)
Luxembourg 1.01∗∗∗(.09) 0.11∗∗∗(.02)) 0.33∗∗∗(.10)
Malaysia 0.30∗∗∗(.01) 0.02∗∗∗(.01) 0.90 (.60)
Mexico 0.85∗∗∗(.04) 0.12∗∗∗(.01) 0.68∗∗∗(.12)
Netherlands 0.30∗∗∗(.01) 0.03∗∗∗(.01) 0.63 (.68)
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Table 2.3: (Continued)
Country Entry Cost Scrap Value Reg. Risk Aversion
New Zealand 0.98∗∗∗(.06) 0.11∗∗∗(.01) 0.42∗∗∗(.09)
Norway 0.89∗∗∗(.03) 0.13∗∗∗(.01) 0.49∗∗∗(.06)
Philippines − 1.19∗∗∗(.06) 0.64∗∗∗(.10)
Poland − 0.98∗∗∗(.05) 0.56∗∗∗(.13)
Portugal − 1.10∗∗∗(.30) 0.42 (.39)
Romania − 0.96∗∗∗(.09) 0.60∗∗∗(.19)
Russia 5.16∗∗∗(.39) 0.89∗∗(.29) 1.06 (1.21)
Slovakia − 0.97∗∗∗(.08) 0.64∗∗∗(.19)
South Africa − 0.88∗∗∗(.15) 0.57∗(.33)
South Korea 1.05∗∗∗(.08) 0.11∗∗∗(.02) 0.36∗∗∗(.10)
Spain 0.87∗∗∗(.03) 0.10 (.01) 0.46∗∗∗(.06)
Sweden 0.88∗∗∗(.04) 0.13∗∗∗(.00) 0.48∗∗∗(.06)
Switzerland 0.80∗∗∗(.02) 0.09∗∗∗(.00) 0.54 (.38)
Thailand 0.17∗∗∗(.01) 0.04∗∗∗(.01) 0.71 (1.14)
Turkey − 1.12∗∗∗(.22) 0.43 (.31)
United Kingdom 0.86∗∗∗(.07) 0.14∗∗∗(.03) 0.50∗∗∗(.14)
United States − − 3.91 (13.6)
Table 2.4 correlates the parameter estimates with numerous empirical indi-
cators of bank profitability, efficiency, economic openness and political and reg-
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ulatory background. Estimated entry costs are significantly higher in markets
that are inefficient, profitable, risky, have a greater share of government own-
ership, and where the banking sector is less developed. Scrap values show the
same pattern. It is interesting that the gap between entry costs and scrap values
is greater in markets that are more profitable with less developed banking sec-
tors. The regulatory risk aversion estimates are significantly higher in markets
that are inefficient and less developed. Higher overhead costs in markets with
more risk averse regulators might be due to a greater burden of compliance.
Furthermore, regulatory risk aversion estimates are strongly positively corre-
lated with other measures of bank regulations, such as minimum capital ratios
and liquidity regulations. Regulators appear more risk averse in markets where
they have less corrective power with respect to existing regulations.
Table 2.4: Correlations with Economic and Regulatory Measures.
Measures Entry Cost Scrap Value Entry-Scrap Reg. Risk A.
Entry Cost 1.00
Scrap Value 0.55 1.00
Entry Minus Scrap 0.96∗∗∗ 0.29 1.00
Reg. Risk Aversion −0.07 0.06 −0.05 1.00
Cap-Acct Open-Index −0.22 −0.35∗∗ 0.01
Distance from U.S. −0.04 −0.06 −0.03 −0.02
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Table 2.4: (Continued)
Measures Entry Cost Scrap Value Entry-Scrap Reg. Risk A.
Common Language −0.05 −0.07 −0.10 −0.22
Average Total Costs 0.40∗∗ 0.05 0.42∗∗ −0.28∗
Avg Overhead Costs 0.52∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
Total Banking Cost −0.14 −0.13 −0.16 −0.13
ICRG Comp Risk −0.36∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗ −0.21 −0.28∗
ICRG Fin. Risk −0.12 −0.55∗∗∗ −0.07 −0.16
Govt ownship Share 0.49∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.37∗ 0.12
Bank Development −0.45∗∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗ −0.35∗ −0.07
Net Interest Margin 0.55∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.14
Nonperf. Loan Share 0.43∗∗∗ 0.17 0.37 0.15
Socialist Legal Origin 0.70∗∗∗ 0.18 0.70∗∗∗ −0.02
OECD Member −0.16 −0.37∗∗ −0.11 −0.47∗∗∗
Corrective Power −0.11 0.26 −0.12 −0.52∗∗∗
Min. Capital Ratio 0.24 0.46∗∗ 0.17 0.28∗
Req. Reserve Ratio 0.07 0.19 −0.02 0.32∗∗
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics For Estimation Results.
Estimates Min 25p 50p 75p Max Mean Std Dev
Reg. Risk Aversion 0.01 0.42 0.50 0.64 1.19 0.52 0.23
Entry Cost 0.17 0.80 0.88 1.01 5.16 1.12 1.05
Scrap Value 0.02 0.11 0.44 0.94 1.91 0.56 0.49
2.6 Simulation Exercises
This section conducts four types of exercises. Subsection 2.6.1.examines the ef-
fect on banks’ optimal behavior of gradually increasing the bank risk aversion
parameter λ, while holding all countries’ regulatory risk aversion parameters
constant at their estimated values. Subsection 2.6.2 examines the effects of in-
creasing all foreign countries’ risk aversion parameters simultaneously, holding
the bank risk aversion λ and the U.S. regulatory risk aversion constant at their
estimated values. Subsection 2.6.3 analyzes the impact of gradual increases in
the U.S. regulator’s risk aversion parameter, while holding λ and all other mar-
kets’ regulatory risk aversion constant. Recall that bank risk aversion is the
weight banks put on the variance of their global portfolios. Furthermore, for-
eign regulatory risk aversion is the weight each country’s bank regulator puts
on the variance of banks’ country–specific portfolios. Finally, U.S. regulatory
risk aversion is the weight the U.S. bank regulator attaches to the variance of
U.S. banks’ domestic portfolios.
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2.6.1 Increasing Bank Risk Aversion
Figures 2.1 through 2.4 show the effects of raising the bank risk aversion param-
eter λ from 0.001 to 4, holding all regulatory risk aversion parameters constant at
their estimated values. For each λ, the value of the banks’ problem is evaluated
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Figure 2.1: Value of Banks’Global Portfolio as Function of Bank Risk Aver-
sion.
at the corresponding fixed entry costs and scrap values.
Figure 2.1 shows that λ has a strong negative impact on the value of the
bank’s global operations. As λ increases from 0.001 to 4, the bank’s simulated
value falls 12 percent. Figure 2.2 depicts the effect of increases in λ at the aver-
age country level. Figure 2.2 shows that both the value of banks’ U.S. operations,
and the average value of foreign country–specific operations are negatively af-
fected. As λ increases from 0.001 to 4, the value of U.S. operations falls 5.1
percent, while the average value of foreign country operations falls 5 percent. It
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Figure 2.2: Values of Bank’s U.S. Operations (Left Scale) and Average For-
eign Country Operations (Right Scale) as Function of Bank Risk
Aversion.
is interesting to take note of Figure 2.3, which shows the effect of increases in λ
on the share of foreign assets that the bank chooses in its portfolio. Figure 2.3
shows that as λ increases from 0.001 to 4, the share of foreign assets in the bank’s
portfolio rise 15.1 percent. A potential explanation for this result is that as banks
become more risk averse, they become more reluctant to take on riskier U.S.
loans. Instead, banks look towards the less risky foreign assets. Within foreign
assets, Figure 2.4 shows that banks move towards cross–border loans relative
to affiliate loans as they become more risk averse. The graph shows that as λ
increases from 0.001 to 4, the ratio of affiliate to cross–border loans falls 1.5 per-
cent. This makes sense in light of the fact that cross–border loans generally tar-
get multi–national corporations and sovereigns — characterized by lower risk
than the retail and smaller corporate clients that affiliate loans target.
Figure 2.5 is an interesting reflection on the suitability of the model for ana-
lyzing bank behavior far from equilibrium values. The graph depicts the effect
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Figure 2.3: Share of Foreign Assets in Bank’s Portfolio as Function of Bank
Risk Aversion.
of increases in λ on the estimated average fixed costs of entry and scrap values.
The graph shows that these estimated costs and scrap values remain constant
until λ reaches 2.4, and increase sharply thereafter. As λ increases from 2.4 to
4, average estimated fixed entry costs rise 23 percent, and scrap values increase
by 65 percent. In light of the fact that there is no reason to expect fixed costs
and scrap values to vary with λ, Figure 2.5 shows that the model behaves well
up to approximately eight times the equilibrium value of λ = 0.34. Beyond that,
however, the model produces unreliable results.
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2.6.2 Increasing Foreign Regulatory Risk Aversion
Regulatory and bank risk aversion work through different channels; bank risk
aversion through the objective function and regulatory risk aversion through a
constraint. This subsection explores the effects of varying all foreign markets’
regulatory risk aversions simultaneously, while keeping the bank risk aversion
and U.S. regulatory risk aversion parameters constant at their estimated values.
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Figure 2.6: Value of Banks’ Global Portfolio as Function of Foreign Regu-
latory Risk Aversion.
Figure 2.6 shows that as all foreign markets’ regulatory risk aversions in-
crease from 0.001 to 4, the value of global operations increases moderately by 1.3
percent. Figure 2.7 shows that a similar increase in foreign θ causes the value of
the bank’s U.S. operations to increase slightly by 1.9 percent, and the value of
the average foreign country operation to fall by 3.6 percent. Figure 2.8 depicts
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the strong negative relationship between foreign θ and the share of foreign as-
sets in the bank’s portfolio. As foreign θ increases from 0.001 to 4, the share of
foreign assets falls by 21.4 percent. Therefore, stricter foreign bank regulations
cause U.S. banks to adopt a much more domestic focus.
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Figure 2.7: Values of Banks’ U.S. Operations (Right Scale) and Average
Foreign Country Operations (Right Scale).
Figure 2.9 depicts the effect of increases in foreign θ on the ratio of affiliate
loans to cross–border loans in the bank’s portfolio. As foreign θ rises up to
4, this ratio decreases significantly by 40.3 percent. Therefore, while stricter
foreign regulations lower foreign participation of U.S. banks altogether, foreign
affiliate assets take a much greater hit relative to cross–border loans. This result
is likely due to the fact that affiliate loans are generally under foreign regulators’
supervision, while the regulation of cross–border loans is often shared by the
U.S. and foreign regulators. Therefore, a stricter foreign regulatory framework
affects affiliate assets to a greater extent.
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Figure 2.8: Share of Foreign Assets in Banks’ Portfolio as Function of For-
eign Regulatory Risk Aversion.
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53
2.6.3 Increasing U.S. Regulatory Risk Aversion
This chapter focuses on the behavior of U.S. banks exclusively. Therefore, it
is particularly interesting to analyze how banks’ optimal behavior changes, as
the U.S. regulators become more risk-averse. This subsection explores the ef-
fects of increasing the risk aversion of U.S. regulators on banks’ optimal behav-
ior. In this exercise, bank risk aversion and all other markets’s regulatory risk
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Figure 2.10: Value of Banks’ Global Portfolio as Function of U.S. Regula-
tory Risk Aversion.
aversions are held constant at their estimated values. Figure 2.10 shows the re-
lationship between the simulated value of the bank’s global operations as the
U.S. regulatory risk aversion θ increases from 0.001 to 4. This increase in U.S.
θ causes the value of the bank’s global operations to fall by 5.5 percent. Figure
2.11 focuses on the country–specific effects of the increase in U.S. θ, depicting
the results for the value of U.S. operations and the value of the average foreign
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Figure 2.11: Value of Banks’ U.S. Operations (Left Scale) and Average For-
eign Country Operations (Right Scale).
country operations. The increase in U.S. θ from 0.001 to 4 causes the value of U.S.
operations to fall by 8.2 percent, and the value of the average foreign country
operation rises by 7.9 percent.
It is interesting to note Figure 2.12’s depiction of the strong positive relation-
ship between the share of foreign assets in the bank’s portfolio and U.S. θ. As
U.S. θ increases from 0.001 to 4, the share of foreign assets in the bank’s global
portfolio increases by 38 percent. Therefore, a stricter U.S. bank regulatory en-
vironment causes U.S. banks to take a more international focus. An increase in
U.S. θ from 0.001 to 4 does not have a notable impact on the ratio of affiliate
loans to cross–border loans in the bank’s global portfolio.
It is also insightful to compare and contrast how U.S. banks’ foreign focus re-
sponds to changes in U.S. versus foreign regulatory strictness. Based on the last
two simulation exercises, it appears that stricter U.S. regulations encourage U.S.
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Regulatory Risk Aversion.
banks’ foreign participation to a greater extent than stricter foreign regulations
discourage them. However, foreign regulations have a very strong impact on
the composition of U.S. banks’ foreign portfolio (greatly discouraging affiliate
lending), while U.S. regulations play only a very small role in these considera-
tions.
2.7 Summary
This chapter examines the determinants of U.S. banks’ international portfolio
choices, with the goal of recovering the underlying structural parameters that
shape these decisions. It presents a dynamic model of mean–variance utility
maximizing monopolistically competitive bank behavior. Banks make period–
by–period choices of optimal domestic, cross–border and foreign affiliate loan
and deposit quantities. In addition, banks make foreign market entry/exit deci-
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sions considering their lifetime utility. All these decisions are bound by budget
and regulatory constraints, and depend on period–specific state variables such
as bank characteristics (initial size and scope) and market traits (return indices,
correlations, proportional costs, taxes, regulations,etc.).
The model is estimated with the two–step Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007)
estimation method for dynamic models of imperfect competition. The first stage
of this method consists of estimating the optimal loan/deposit quantity and en-
try/exit choices period by period. The second stage then relies on these esti-
mates to simulate the value of banks’ optimal actions forward, as well as the
values of alternate policy paths. Setting up inequalities using these simulated
policy functions makes possible the estimation of the unknown structural pa-
rameters. These estimable parameters are country–specific fixed entry costs and
scrap values, and the weights that capital regulators assign to the risk on bank
portfolios. In addition, an estimate of banks’ constant risk aversion parameter
is obtained.
The estimation uses U.S. regulatory data spanning 3 bank size categories,
33 time periods between 1997 Q4 and 2005 Q4, and 46 countries. The estima-
tion results for the policy functions (corresponding to the first step) show that
controlling for selection bias in lending choices is important: banks lend on av-
erage 32.98 percent more to selected markets compared to a random sample of
markets (corresponding to a correlation coefficient of 0.31 between the market
presence and loan/deposit quantity equations). Selection causes upward bias
in the coefficient estimates of over 12 percent. Furthermore, bank size (defined
as total assets) and bank scope (defined as the lagged Sharpe ratio) have strong
explanatory power in U.S. banks’ foreign lending behavior, while market char-
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acteristics appear much less important. Scope has a stronger impact relative to
size: results show that bank scope’s effect is over three times as large as the
size effect in the market entry and exit, as well as the loan and deposit quantity
choices. In addition, cross–border loans and affiliate loans are shown to have
very different sensitivities to bank and market traits — underlining the impor-
tance of examining them separately.
Estimation of the unknown structural parameters (corresponding to the sec-
ond stage of the estimation) yields strongly significant estimates for the entry
costs, scrap values and risk aversion parameters. In order to avoid estimates
that depend on the scale of banks’ operations in each country, banks’ net interest
income is adjusted for the scale–dependent operating costs (including branch
network expenses). Simulated estimation results show that banks’ constant,
common absolute risk aversion parameter λ is 0.34 — somewhat higher than
the previously estimated risk aversion parameters (e.g. Nishiyama 2007). Fur-
thermore, estimates of regulators’ risk aversion parameters vary greatly across
countries. Bank regulators are generally more risk averse than banks, with an
average risk aversion parameter of 0.52.
Correlations show that there is a strong positive relationship between es-
timates of entry costs and scrap values — indicating that countries which are
more costly to enter also offer the possibility of greater scrap values. Correla-
tion of the parameter estimates with empirical measures of location, economic
strength and regulatory strictness (such as risk ratings, etc) reveals strong pat-
terns. In particular, estimated entry costs appear higher in foreign markets that
are inefficient, have greater government ownership in banks and are more prof-
itable. Entry costs appear significantly higher in the Eastern European coun-
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Table 2.6: Effects of Changes in Risk Aversion from 0.001 to 4 (Percent).
Change Global U.S. Avg Fgn Estim Estim Fgn Aff/CB
in Risk Opers. Opers. Opers. Entry Scrap Assets Loan
Aversion Value Value Value Costs Value Share Ratio
Bank’s −12 −5.1 −5 23 65 15.1 −1.5
Foreign 1.3 1.9 −3.6 −1.2 −2.5 −21.4 −40.3
Regulator
U.S. −5.5 −8.2 7.9 −3 −8.7 38 −0.001
Regulator
tries, and above average in Asian economies. Estimated regulatory risk aver-
sions are higher in inefficient markets with stricter, but less effective, bank reg-
ulatory environments.
Simulation exercises are conducted to examine the effects on banks’ optimal
behavior of perturbing the bank risk aversion parameter, all foreign countries’
risk aversions, and the U.S. regulator’s risk aversion. These simulation exercises
measure the effects of the perturbations on the overall value of banks’ global
operations; the value of U.S. operations, as well as the value of the average
foreign country operation; the share of foreign assets in banks’ portfolio, and the
ratio of affiliate loans to cross–border loans. Table 2.6 summarizes the results of
these simulation exercises.
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CHAPTER 3
BRANCH NETWORK AND INTEREST RATE CHOICES OF HUNGARIAN
COMMERCIAL BANKS
3.1 Introduction
Numerous studies and bank surveys (Bancography, 2003; Spieker, 2004) show
that branch networks are an important strategic tool of commercial banks, in ad-
dition to the choices of interest rates. While building new branches is a power-
ful method of expanding market share, doing so is also very expensive. Surveys
measured the fixed setup cost of a new branch to range from 1 million U.S. Dol-
lars (Sheffield, 2006) to upward of 2 million U.S. Dollars (Spieker, 2004) in the
U.S., which does not even include associated operating expenditures (Bancog-
raphy, 2003). 1. In light of the non–trivial benefits of branch network expansion,
the purpose of this chapter is to examine imperfectly competitive Hungarian
commercial banks’s strategic choices of interest rates and branch network size
in a dynamic setting. The chapter formulates a comprehensive model of bank
behavior that captures branch network competition. Using bank–level Hun-
garian commercial banking data, the determinants of interest rate and branch
network size choices, as well as the fixed branch setup costs and scrap values
are estimated based on the modeling framework.
Branch network decisions are very closely tied to client location and socioe-
conomic status. Looking at the U.S. commercial banking market, surveys of the
Federal Reserve Board suggest that the single most important factor influencing
1In the case of U.S. commercial banks, it has been documented that average total costs actu-
ally increase with branch network size (Spieker, 2004)
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customers’ choice of banks is the location of bank’s branches (Governor Mark
W. Olson, 2004). Furthermore, MarkeTech International assessed that traits re-
lated to location may account for 45 to 55 percent of deposit formation (Hopson
and Rymers, 2003). Banks indeed take account of these factors in their branch-
ing decisions: per capita income and population density have been shown to be
significant drivers of branch network expansion. These observations on bank
and client behavior are the motivation behind this chapter’s modeling of com-
mercial bank branch network size choice as a game of spatial competition.
This chapter presents a dynamic Salop–style spatial competition model of
profit maximizing commercial banks. Banks participate in retail and corpo-
rate banking markets. In the retail banking market, banks make loans in a
variety of currencies, and compete in lending, mortgage and deposit rates, as
well as their branch network size. Banks derive market power from the loca-
tion of their branches, which they can influence by expanding or contracting
their branch network. The corporate banking market is modeled as perfectly
competitive, motivated by the discussions of Hungarian commercial banking in
Molna´r, Horva´th, and Nagy (2007) and Mo´re´ and Nagy (2004). Therefore, banks
take the corporate lending rates of all currencies as given.
Banks’ dynamic profit maximization problem consists of two types of deci-
sions. On one hand, banks make interest rate choices period by period. Interest
rate choices only influence current profits and are therefore static.2 On the other
hand, banks choose the size of their branch network. Branch setup and closing
decisions have–long term consequences, as the resulting branch network size
will impact market share and interest rate choices for periods to come. In this
2That is, banks reassess the interest rates they charge on loans and pay on deposits each
period.
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chapter’s modeling of branch opening and closing decisions, banks take these
long–term consequences into account.
A version of the Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) simulation–based estima-
tion method is fitted to the framework of the theoretical model. Banks’ opti-
mal choices are estimated in two stages. The first stage examines the impact
of current state variables (such as competitors’ branch network size, consumer
income, etc.) on banks’ choices of interest rates. This stage also yields esti-
mates of the determinants of banks’ choices of how many new branches to open
or close (constituting the transition probabilities for branch network size). Re-
sults show that banks charge a premium for greater branch network size in their
lending rates, and offer lower deposit rates accordingly. Furthermore, greater
branch network size of competitors induces banks to ask lower rates on loans,
and offer higher deposit rates. A similar competitive pattern is observed in the
branch network expansion and contraction choices: more branches of competi-
tors make banks more likely to expand. Furthermore, banks with bigger branch
networks are less likely to add new branches.
The second stage of the estimation uses the first–stage policy function esti-
mates to construct banks’ discounted expected sum of profits via forward sim-
ulation. Using the structure fitted to bank behavior, the values of numerous
alternate policy paths are simulated. Estimates of branch setup costs and scrap
values are then chosen to ensure that banks’ observed (optimal) actions yield
the highest bank value. Monthly estimates of branch setup costs show that with
an average cost of 148.81 million HUF (approximately 0.75 million USD), set-
ting up branches is considerably cheaper in Hungary than the U.S.3. With a
mean of 109.48 million HUF, scrap values are approximately 75 percent of setup
3Much of this difference is likely be explained by deviations from price parity
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costs. Setup costs and scrap values are very strongly positively correlated. Fur-
thermore, they move closely with producer price indices capturing the cost of
manufacturing and construction. Various simulation exercises are presented
following the estimation, confirming the important role of branch network com-
petition in bank behavior.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Subsection 3.1.1 provides an overview of
Hungarian commercial banks’ behavior during the sample period of January
2004 to November 2007. Section 3.2 motivates the modeling framework in the
context of the related literature. Section 3.3 presents the model and character-
izes banks’ optimal behavior. Section 3.4 covers the estimation method and de-
scribes the data. Section 3.5 presents and discusses the estimation results, and
Section 3.6 describes the simulation exercises. Section 3.7 summarizes and con-
cludes the chapter.
3.1.1 Overview of the Hungarian Commercial Banking Market
The time period under examination in this paper is January 2004 to November
2007. During this time, the Hungarian retail banking sector is characterized
by a high degree of market power, and active branch network expansion and
contraction. The overview in this subsection focuses on two strategic tools of
competition: choices of interest rates and branch network size.
An interesting and unique characteristic of the former Communist Central
and Eastern European economies is the high share of foreign currency lend-
ing and deposit–taking relative to the local currency. During the period un-
der examination, an average of 70 percent of Hungarian bank lending took
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place in foreign currencies, mostly in Euros (EUR), the Swiss Franc (CHF) and
the Japanese Yen (YEN). Various foreign currencies appear within sub–types of
loans (mortgages, retail, corporate), i.e. there is no specialization of loan types
by currency.
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Figure 3.1: Average Retail Loan Rates by Currency Over Time.
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Figure 3.2: Average Retail Deposit Rates by Currency Over Time.
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Figure 3.3: Average Mortgage Rates by Currency Over Time.
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Figure 3.4: Average Corporate Lending Rates by Currency Over Time.
It is interesting to explore the reasons underlying the use of multiple curren-
cies by banks: Ize and Yeyati (2003) show that risk averse banks are more prone
to foreign currency holdings in the presence of lower exchange rate volatility
and high price volatility. Pelle´nyi and Bilek (2009) argue that both these factors
were present in Hungary during the 2004–2007 period: inflation was relatively
high compared to the EUR and CHF. At the same time, the Gyurcsany Admin-
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istration promised to reduce exchange rate volatility by keeping the HUF fluc-
tuations against the EUR within a 15 percent band (according to ERM-II). This
latter action also contributed to the fact that consumers treated loans of various
currencies as near perfect substitutes, vastly underestimating currency risk in
pursuit of the significantly lower interest rates on foreign currency loans.4
Figures 3.1 and 3.3 and 3.4 show that the lending rates on different currency
denominations vary widely. Most notable is the large spread between the retail
lending rates on EUR and CHF loans, compared to the the HUF rate. Adjust-
ing for expectations in currency appreciation (as well as inflation) does not ex-
plain away the large observed interest rate spreads between HUF and foreign
currency–denominated loans.5 The interest rate gap that remains between HUF
and foreign currency loans after adjustments is large at around 10 percent. Per-
sistent deviations from UIP have been well documented in the literature (Froot
and Thaler, 1990). What might explain the empirical failure of UIP in the Hun-
garian case?
There is a clear and solid explanation for the low cost of foreign currency
borrowing in Hungary. Basso, Calvo-Gonzales, and Jurgilas (2007) argue that
banks which are headquartered abroad (characterizing the majority of Hungar-
ian commercial banks) have easy access to foreign currency, at a low cost.6 In
the presence of monopolistic competition, they can use this advantage to com-
pete for consumers via lower rates on foreign currency loans. Furthermore, it
4Pelle´nyi and Bilek (2009) also present evidence that socioeconomic characteristics (such as
education, income, etc.) fail to explain borrowers’ choice of currency denominations.
5While Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) does not explain the difference between HUF and
foreign currency lending rates — as shown in Figure B.1 — it is in fact able to account for
differences between observed EUR and CHF loan rates. It also explains differences in HUF and
EUR deposit rates as shown by Figure B.2.
6Most foreign banks operating in Hungary are from Euro–zone countries. Therefore, the
empirical fact that appreciation and inflation–adjusted EUR rates are consistently the lowest is
in line with this argument on lower cost of foreign currency access.
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has been argued that the very high cost of HUF borrowing is due to the uncer-
tainty banks face in light of the unpredictable and imprudent fiscal policy of the
Hungarian government (Ewing, May 6 2010). The time period under consider-
ation between 2004 and 2007 was indeed characterized by a lot of uncertainty
about fiscal policy, culminating in Prime Minister Gyurcsany’s admission (on
September 18, 2006) of having lied about fiscal actions and outcomes for several
consecutive years (Condon, September 19 2006).
In light of the apparent gap between HUF and foreign currency borrow-
ing rates, it is important to address the issue of arbitrage. For banks, the arbi-
trage opportunity would be to borrow from their Euro–zone parents at a low
rate, change foreign currency into HUF, and make HUF loans at the higher rate.
However, the lack of demand for loans at high rates greatly limits this opportu-
nity. From consumers’ perspective, the arbitrage opportunity would be to take
out EUR and CHF loans at low rates, then re–lend the money at the higher rates
after conversion into HUF. However, this opportunity is again limited by the ap-
parent and persistent lack of demand for HUF loans at the high rates (Holland,
Cochrane, and Penz, October 30 2008).
An important goal of this chapter is to address the role of branch networks
in competition. Branch network size is an important source of market power
in Hungary. According to Cottarelli (1998), ”[the persistent market power of
commercial banks is] largely reflecting their continued branch monopoly in re-
gions of the country. The factor behind the continued dominance of these banks
is the relatively high cost of establishing a branch network”. It is indeed proof
of the continued use of branch networks as a strategic tool that the time pe-
riod under examination is very active in terms of branch network expansion
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and contraction. Figure 3.5 documents a steady sharp increase in the per–bank
branch network size throughout the sample period. Figure 3.6 shows that the
month–on–month branch network size change ranges from (−6) to (6) branches.
The most common choices for the change in network size were closing 1 branch,
keeping branch network size constant, and opening 1 branch.
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Figure 3.5: Average Branch Network Size Over Time.
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3.2 Motivation and Related Literature
This section gives summaries of the three strands of relevant literature. These
strands are: (1) modeling imperfect and spatial competition in commercial bank-
ing; (2) dynamic estimation techniques for models of imperfect competition,
and (3) evolution of Hungarian commercial banking.
3.2.1 Commercial Bank Competition
There have been numerous, mostly empirical papers, addressing spatial (branch
network) competition in commercial banking markets. Most of the previous
studies have focused on only one of the areas of deposit rate, lending rate or
branch network competition. As an early example, Barros (1999) develops a
spatial competition model to explain price differences across banks in the de-
posit market. His model separates two sources of market power: collusion in
banking services, and location (taking branch networks as given). The paper
examines whether banks’ profitability is a result of conduct or market structure
(location). He finds that location–based market power is the more important
explanation for high margins in deposits. The applicability of Barros’ work to
the current framework is limited in that (1) he takes loan markets and branch
networks as given — examining deposit rates as the only strategic tool, and (2)
he abstracts away from any dynamic considerations.
Dell’Ariccia (2001) paints a more complete picture of strategic bank behav-
ior by presenting a multi–period model of spatial competition, where banks’
entry/exit decisions are endogenously determined. The paper shows that un-
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der asymmetric information and learning by lending, in equilibrium there is a
finite number of competitors even in the absence of exogenous fixed costs. Even
though the theoretical model (a multi–period extension of the Salop spatial com-
petition model) is similar to the one presented in this chapter, Dell’Ariccia ex-
cludes branch banking as a strategic decision (the strategic choice of banks is
whether to exist or not).
The work of Calem and Nakamura (1998) is one step closer to the frame-
work of this chapter in that they explicitly include branch network competition.
They build a model to show that branch banking broadens the geographic scope
of competition among banks, and that banking services at peripheral locations
will be priced more competitively when those locales are served by branch net-
works. Their theoretical model contains a central location with multiple bank-
ing outlets, and outlying locations with few banking outlets. Calem and Naka-
mura find that branching restrictions are associated with larger price differen-
tials across banks. While their paper depicts branch banking, their main focus
is to model a Bertrand pricing game between two banks that are competitors at
the central location, but also have outlying branches.
Another step closer to the formulation of this chapter is Chiappori, Perez-
Castrillo, and Verdier (1995). They analyze a spatial competition model of the
banking sector, where banks offer loan and deposit services — though in a static
setting. The goal of their paper is to investigate the consequences of the regu-
lation of rates paid on deposits. The authors find that regulation first increases
network size beyond social optimum, and in the long run result in lower equi-
librium credit rates because of increased competition. They also show that reg-
ulation leads to tied services — as a result, an upper limit on deposit rates also
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restricts lending rates. They consider a one–period imperfect price competition
model. The paper also incorporates spatial competition in the Salop framework.
The applicability of their approach to this chapter is limited in that the authors
exclude multi–branch banking by considering each branch to be an independent
entity.
Kim and Vale (2001) build a bank branching model, where they consider the
role of the size of the branch network in the provision of loans. The authors
estimate a model of branching decisions where banks explicitly take account of
both their own existing network and their expectation of rivals’ choices. The
paper tests whether there exist external informational spill–overs among banks
due to branch network proliferation. They want to see whether branch net-
works have a market size effect, or only a market share effect. The paper sets
up a non–price oligopolistic model of bank behavior in the loan market. The
authors derive and estimate a simultaneous equations system of bank–level op-
timization rules for branching choice and loan equations. The predictions of
the model are tested on Norwegian bank–level panel data. The paper’s multi–
period spatial competition model is relevant for this chapter, since it explicitly
incorporates bank branching choices. However, in their model there is no price
(interest rate) competition — banks treat loan quantities as their choice variable
instead.
Estrada and Rozo’s (2006) model incorporates competition in interest rates
as well. They present a multi–market spatial competition oligopoly structure
for the Colombian deposit market. In their model, banks use price and non–
price strategies to compete in two periods. In the first period, banks choose
the optimal loan and deposit rates for the whole country, according to Bertrand
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competition. In the second period, banks select the number of branches they
plan to open in each region, given the optimal interest rates. While the strategic
variables and the multi–period setup is relevant, their two–step optimization
approach diverges from this chapter’s goal. This is because the current chapter
aims to model banks’ lending and deposit rate, as well as bank network size
choices simultaneously.
The modeling approach presented in this chapter is in agreement with that of
Cerasi, Chizzolini, and Ivaldi (2002), who argue that branch network and price
competition are closely tied together, and must be simultaneously modeled.
They do this using a static non–cooperative two–stage game, where branching
decisions are taken in the first stage, and monopolistically competitive interest
rates are set in the second stage. The authors derive structural equations in or-
der to measure branching costs and degree of competition in banking services,
and fit the model’s equations to bank–level European panel data.
Closest to this chapter is the work of Kim, Lozano-Vivas, and Morales (2007),
who present a multi–strategic, multi–market and multi–output oligopolistic spa-
tial model of a monopolistically competitive banking sector. In their model,
banks take explicit account of the impact of their strategies on their existing
branch network and market share, as well as the reaction of their competitors.
The three strategic variables of each bank are: deposit interest rates, loan inter-
est rates and the number of branches in a given region. Kim, Vivas and Morales
present a static model, whose parameters are estimated using Spanish data. This
chapter takes a similar modeling framework and extends it to a more realistic
dynamic setting.
A closely related paper by Berger and Mester (2003) examines the relation-
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ship between commercial bank efficiency and branch network size. They find
that greater branch network size does not provide cost efficiencies — but there
are indeed revenue improvements. The authors explain banks’ continued drive
to expand their branch network size and improve services by the assertion that
the corresponding growth in revenues outpaces cost increases.
An important part of this chapter’s analysis is to account for how consumers
respond to changes in the attributes of banking services (albeit in a spatial com-
petition framework). This approach is motivated by Dick (2007), who estimates
the demand for deposit services in the U.S. commercial banking industry. Her
goal is to assess the effect on consumers of the significant changes in banking
services throughout the 1990s. Dick’s model accommodates the various changes
that have taken place in banking markets, as well as the elimination of branch-
ing restrictions on U.S. banks. The author estimates a multinomial discrete
choice nested logit model of demand. This is a structural model which incor-
porates product differentiation. The results show that consumers respond to
various bank attributes, beyond prices. The results also suggest that consumers
have benefited from nationwide branching in the United States.
3.2.2 Estimation Method
The main contribution of this chapter compared to previous literature is the pre-
sentation of spatial bank competition in a dynamic framework. Taking account
of dynamics is especially important when looking at branch network competi-
tion, where branch building and closing decisions have consequences that last
well beyond a single period. However, solving a full–fledged dynamic opti-
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mization problem has a very high computational cost. The problem is made
tractable by formulating a version of the Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) two–
step estimation method (motivated by Hotz and Miller (1993)) for the current
framework.
The first stage of the two–step estimation consists of a reduced–form regres-
sion of banks’ policy functions on all the current state variables. Using these
estimates, it is possible to get a form of banks’ discounted sum of expected prof-
its as functions of the state variables and the model’s structural parameters only.
Furthermore, data can be used to estimate the transition probabilities of all the
relevant state variables. The second stage consists of forward simulation of the
values of bank’s optimal choices. Best estimates of the structural parameters
are then chosen to ensure the optimality of observed actions compared to any
other sub–optimal policy paths. Further relevant papers — discussing estima-
tion methods which avoid solving the full–blown dynamic optimization prob-
lem — are Ericson and Pakes (1995), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Olley
and Pakes (1996) and Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry. (2007).
3.2.3 Evolution of Hungarian Commercial Banking
There have been numerous papers examining the conditions of the Hungar-
ian commercial retail banking market starting with the first years of privati-
zation in the early 1990s (A´bel and Bonin, 2000; A´bel and Siklos, 2004; Kira´ly
and Va´rhegyi, 2004; Majnoni, Shankar, and Va´rhegyi, 2003). Notably, Va´rhegyi
(2004) describes the competitive evolution of the Hungarian banking sector. She
examines bank competition in Hungary using a structural approach. This ap-
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proach assumes that the best way to influence competition is by affecting the
market structure. The study first examines bank competition in Hungary since
1990, and then uses behavioral models to describe bank competition in the pe-
riod 1995–2002. The paper argues that during this period, banks had a price–
setting role in loan markets, and a price–accepting role in deposit markets. The
author uses various empirical I.O. models to test market structure and market
power. The modeling formulation of this chapter is partly motivated by the fol-
lowing findings of Va´rhegyi (2004): (1) while the corporate loan market is com-
petitive, the retail market is still characterized by considerable market power of
banks, and (2) price competition is the best description of strategic choices in
the Hungarian banking market — while collusion can be ruled out.
In a related paper, Mo´re´ and Nagy (2004) investigate the degree of bank com-
petition in Hungary in various sub–markets. The authors conjecture that there
is a high degree of market power in consumer lending, and that competitive
pricing prevails in the corporate lending market (in line with Va´rhegyi (2004)).
Mo´re´ and Nagy (2004) use a non–structural model of competition to test their
hypotheses of competition, using bank–level panel data. After estimating con-
jectural variation for each sub–market, they show that the degree of competi-
tion in both the loan and deposit markets falls between perfect competition and
the Cournot equilibrium. The consumer credit sub–market, however, is charac-
terized by a much lower degree of competition: between Cournot equilibrium
and perfect collusion. Low level of competition and inelastic demand allows
banks to receive large oligopolistic rents in the consumer credit sub–market. Es-
timating the loss of consumer surplus resulting from imperfect competition, the
authors find these losses to be small.
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The model of this chapter is informed by Molna´r, Horva´th, and Nagy (2007),
who build a structural model of the Hungarian retail banking industry. In this
static model, the authors estimate residual demand and supply functions of
household loan and deposit services. For the supply side, the authors consider
two models of the banking industry: a static, differentiated–product Nash–
Bertrand oligopoly and a cartel. For each supply model, the pricing decisions of
the bank depend on the individual bank–level demands. The authors estimate a
discrete choice multinomial logit model of demand for consumers’ loan demand
and deposit services. The results show that the observed price–cost margins are
very high for overdrafts, higher purchase loans, personal loans and demand
deposits, and lower for short–term and long–term deposits. In order to iden-
tify the structure of competition, the authors compare the estimated price–cost
margins implied by the Nash–Bertrand and cartel models to the observed val-
ues. The results suggest that in the overdraft, hire purchase loan, personal loan,
demand deposit, and short–term deposit markets, the degree of competition
is low. Long-term deposit markets can be characterized as fairly competitive.
When the authors control for consumer default risks and inflation, the observed
margins are even closer to competitive values.
3.3 Model
This section describes the theoretical modeling framework. The economy con-
sists of households, firms and commercial banks. There is a large number of
utility–maximizing households. The corporate sector consists of a fixed number
of profit–maximizing firms f = 1 . . . F. There is a total number of T periods, with
t indexing the individual period. The time subscript is suppressed throughout
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the description of the model. There are a total of J commercial banks in the
economy, with j = 1 . . . J indexing the individual bank. Commercial banks pro-
vide deposit and loan services to retail customers, and loan services to corporate
customers. Banks’ goal is to maximize the discounted sum of expected profits
over time. They do so by choosing lending rates, deposit rates and their branch
network size in the retail sector. Banks choose their optimal lending rates in the
corporate sector (where there is no spatial competition, and network size plays
no role).
The economy consists of a single location, which has a circular shape in ac-
cordance with the Salop spatial competition model as described in Salop (1979)
and Freixas and Rochet (2008). The circular economy has circumference A. Each
bank j has one headquarter, and a number n of bank branches, denoted by n j.
Then the total number of branches in the economy is N =
∑
j n j. Bank branches
are uniformly distributed along the Salop circle, so that the distance between
each branch is AN . Households are also uniformly distributed along the Salop
circle, with a total mass of A. As banks increase their branch network size, N
changes over time. However, A changes at the same rate as N, so that the ra-
tio A/N (and hence the location of each existing branch) is independent of new
branching decisions. Figure 3.7 describes the locational structure of the model.
3.3.1 Retail Sector — Households
Households live for two periods, and consume the single consumption good c
in each period. Households form overlapping generations, so that some house-
holds are in their first period of life, while others are in their second (last) period
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Figure 3.7: Illustration of Model Structure.
of life in each period t. Given their income I, each household’s goal is to choose
consumption ct so as to maximize the sum of its discounted expected utility
over the two periods of its lifetime. Households are identical except for their
discount factor βh, which defines each household’s ‘type’. The discount factor
is known and is drawn from a uniform distribution U[0, 1]. This distribution is
constant over time, and the βh draws are independent across periods.
Households can save (and deposit at the bank) some of their income in the
first period of their life, that is, when they are young. A negative saving sh < 0
implies borrowing. Households deposit their saving and obtain their borrowing
at the nearest bank branch along the circle. The nearest branch charges rate rhl
on loans and pays rate rhd on deposits.
The retail banking market (both lending and deposit–taking) is monopolisti-
cally competitive. This is because households are constrained by their location,
and can only choose between the two nearest branches. This serves as a source
of market power for banks. Each household takes
(
I; βh; rhd; r
h
l
)
as given. Let x
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denote the distance between the household and the nearest branch, which the
consumer must travel to access banking services. Then each household’s goal
is to choose the stream of consumptions C =
(
ch1, c
h
2
)
so as to maximize its dis-
counted lifetime sum of logarithmic utilities as follows.
max
C
log
(
ch1
)
+ βh · log
(
ch2
)
−
(
1 + βh
)
· log (x) (3.1)
subject to
ch1 ≤ I − sh
ch2 ≤ I +
(
1 + rhl
)
·min
{
sh, 0
}
+
(
1 + rhd
)
·max
{
sh, 0
} (3.2)
There are two types of young people in each period: borrowers (with sh < 0)
and depositors (with sh > 0). Young household type depends on the discount
factor βh. Furthermore, households form expectations of next period’s income
such that E (I′) = I.
Let lh = sh if sh < 0. Solving for depositors and borrowers separately, we get
sh
∗
=
 βh
(
1 + rhd
)
− 1(
1 + rhd
) (
1 + βh
)
 I
ch1
∗
=

(
2 + rhd
)
(
1 + βh
) (
1 + rhd
) I
ch2
∗
=

(
2 + rhd
)
βh(
1 + βh
)  I
(3.3)
for depositors. The corresponding solution for borrowers is
lh
∗
=
 1 − βh
(
1 + rhl
)(
1 + rhl
) (
1 + βh
)
 I
ch1
∗
=

(
2 + rhl
)
(
1 + βh
) (
1 + rhl
) I
ch2
∗
=

(
2 + rhl
)
βh(
1 + βh
)  I
(3.4)
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It follows that the effect of βh on whether the household is a depositor or
borrower is as follows:
Depositor if
1
1 + rhd
< βh
No banking if
1
1 + rhl
< βh <
1
1 + rhd
Borrower if βh <
1
1 + rhl
(3.5)
Given the known uniform distribution of βh and the total mass of consumers A,
we can integrate over the ranges defined in (3.5) to get the approximate market
supply of deposits and market demand for loans as follows.
Deposit Supply:
Dh =
∫ 1
(1+rhd)
−1
(
sh
)∗
dβh · A =
(
3.2rhd + 0.4 + r
h2
d
)
· I · A
Loan Demand:
Lh =
∫ (1+rhl )−1
0
(
lh
)∗
dβh · A =
(
1 − 1.5rhl − rh2l
)
· I · A
(3.6)
Banks observe the market supply of deposits and the market demand for loans.
Substitution of the optimal solutions from Equations (3.3) and (3.4) yields the
young household’s lifetime indirect utility Vh. Letting subscript m = (d, l) for
deposits and loans, this indirect utility is given by
Vh
(
βh, I, x, rhm
)
= u
(
ch1
)∗
+ βh · u
(
ch2
)∗ − (1 + βh) · log (x) =
log

(
2 + rhm
)
· I(
1 + βh
) (
1 + rhm
)
 + βh · log
β
h ·
(
2 + rhm
)
· I
1 + βh
 − (1 + βh) · log (x) (3.7)
Given that households are uniformly distributed along the Salop circle, they
can choose to bank at either of the two nearest bank branches, depending on the
offered interest rates rhm and the distance x. Let j and j + 1 index two branches
owned by bank j and j+1, respectively. The location of the marginal household
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is characterized by the critical value of x, denoted by x¯, such that the household
is indifferent between going to branch j and branch j + 1. Let rhj and r
h
j+1 denote
the rates offered at branches j and j + 1, respectively. Using a first–order Taylor
expansion and (3.7), the approximate location of the marginal household is7
x¯ =
A ·
(
2 +
(
rhj − rhj+1
)
·
(
βh ·
(
1 + rhj
)
− 1
))
4N · (1 + βh) (3.8)
From (3.8) it follows that a higher x¯ means more customers for branch j. There-
fore, (3.8) implies that branch j’s borrower customer base shrinks with higher
lending rates, and its depositor base increases in higher rates. Similarly, higher
lending rates of competitors increase branch j’s client base, while higher deposit
rates of competitors mean fewer depositors at branch j8. Furthermore, rhj = r
h
j+1
implies that the marginal client is halfway between the two nearest branches.
Banks observe the location of the marginal household, and take x¯ into account
in their deposit/lending rate and branch network size decisions. In the follow-
ing analysis, the values of β are fixed such that βh = 0 for those who borrow, and
βh = 1 for depositors.
3.3.2 Firms
There are F firms in the economy, with subscript f denoting the individual firm.
Firms are owned by shareholders, who provide starting capital b in each period.
Shareholders’ goal is to maximize profits over the course of two periods. Profits
are distributed to shareholders at the end of the second period. Each firm pro-
duces a single good yt that is identical across all firms. Let superscript c denote
7This critical value x¯ is obtained by solving V
(
βh, I, x¯, rhj
)
= V
(
βh, I,
(
A
N − x¯
)
, rhj+1
)
.
8This follows directly from the characterization described in (3.5).
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corporate. Capital K =
(
kc1; k
c
2
)
is the only input in the production of the iden-
tical good. The production function is concave and given by y = f (kc). The
production technology is identical across all firms and over time.
Banks lend to firms in perfectly competitive loan markets. Each firm can obtain
corporate loan lc from banks at the perfectly competitive corporate lending rate
rcl . Corporate loan l
c borrowed in the first period must be repaid in the second
period. Firms sell their output to households for consumption. Households
pay a price of one (unity) for the output in both periods of the firm’s life. Let βc
denote the firm’s known discount factor, whose uniform distribution U [0, 1] is
constant over time (with the βc draws also independent over time). Then firm
f ’s two–period profit-maximization problem is to choose K =
(
kc1; k
c
2
)
so as to
max
K
√
kc1 + β
c ·
√
kc2
subject to
kc1 ≤ b + lc
kc2 ≤ b −
(
1 + rcl
) · lc
(3.9)
The corresponding optimal solutions are
(
kc1
)∗
=
(
2 + rcl
)
· b(
1 + rcl
) (
1 + βc2
(
1 + rcl
))
(
kc2
)∗
=
βc2
(
1 + rcl
) (
2 + rcl
)
· b
1 + βc2
(
1 + rcl
)
l∗ct =
(
1 − βc2
(
1 + rcl
)2) · b(
1 + rcl
) (
1 + βc2
(
1 + rcl
))
(3.10)
It follows that each firm borrows a non–negative amount only if its discount
factor βc is sufficiently low, i.e. if βc ≤
(
1 + rcl
)−1
. Since there are F identical firms
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in the economy, firms’ market demand function for bank loans is given by
(Lc)∗ =
(
1 − βc2
(
1 + rcl
))
· F · b(
1 + rcl
) (
1 + βc2
(
1 + rcl
)) (3.11)
Each bank observes this market demand function for loans.
3.3.3 Banks
Bank Services to Households
Each bank j provides lending and deposit services to households after choosing
its optimal retail lending rate
(
rhl j
)∗
, retail deposit rate
(
rhd j
)∗
and branch network
size
(
n j
)∗
. Recall that each bank can operate multiple branches. Suppose bank
j operates the j’th branch. The quantities of deposits supplied and loans de-
manded depend on whether the neighboring branches — denoted by j − 1 and
j + 1 — belong the bank j or not. Given the characterization in (3.8) of the
location of the marginal household, the expected volume of loans and deposits
attracted by bank j is
E
(
Lhj
)
= n j ·
{Lh
4
· A
N
·
[
Prob ( j − 1 = j) · Prob ( j + 1 = j) · (4)
+ Prob ( j − 1 , j) · Prob ( j + 1 , j) ·
(
4 + rhl j+1 + r
h
l j−1 − 2rhl j
)
+ Prob ( j − 1 = j) · Prob ( j + 1 , j) ·
(
4 + 2
(
2 + rhl j+1 − rhl j
))]}
(3.12)
In (3.12), the first line within the curly brackets shows the expected branch–
specific loan demand if both neighboring branches belong to bank j. The second
line shows the expected demand if none of the neighboring branches belong
to bank j. The last line shows the expected branch–level demand if only one
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of the neighboring branches belongs to bank j. The per–branch expected loan
demand is then multiplied by the number of branches bank j owns. The similar
expression for the quantity of deposits supplied that bank j expects to attract is:
E
(
Dhj
)
= n j ·
{ A
8N
· D
h
A
·
[
Prob ( j − 1 = j) · Prob ( j + 1 = j) · (4)
+ Prob ( j − 1 , j) · Prob ( j + 1 , j) ·
(
4 + rhd j ·
(
2rhd j − rhd j+1 − rhd j−1
))
+ Prob ( j − 1 = j) · Prob ( j + 1 , j) ·
(
8 + 2rhd j ·
(
rhd j−hd j+1
))]}
(3.13)
Note that Equations (3.12) and (3.13) are constant in the term AN . This implies that
new branches bring new customers, and the location of each existing branch
is independent of new branching decisions. A further implication is that new
branches do not cause consumers to regroup. Therefore, for given interest rates
there are two ways branch network size n j impacts the expected loan and de-
posit volumes of bank j. First, adding a new branch expands the loan and de-
posit volumes by the per–branch amounts shown in (3.12) and (3.13) in curly
brackets. Second, n j affects the probabilities that the neighboring branches also
belong to bank j. The following subsections describe banks’ optimal choices of
the interest rates and branch network size.
3.3.4 Price Competition
Banks choose their interest rates period by period, in an imperfect competition
setting. The interest rate choices are static because profits are redistributed to
bank shareholders at the end of each period. Therefore, chosen interest rates in-
fluence current profits, but have no impact on future profits. Let Ψ =
(
chl ; c
h
d; c
c
l
)
denote the proportional costs of household lending, deposit taking and corpo-
rate lending, respectively. Furthermore, φ is the required reserve ratio, r˜ de-
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notes the interest paid on interbank loans and cn j is the per–branch operational
cost. In price competition, each bank’s goal is to choose the optimal values of
R∗j =
(
rh∗l j ; r
h∗
d j; r
c∗
l j
)
so as to maximize the price–relevant part of its profit function
in each period, taking its network size n j as given.
max
R j
E
(
pi j
)
=
(
rhl j − r˜ − chl j
)
· E
(
Lhj
)
+
(
r˜ · (1 − φ) − rhd j − chd j
)
· E
(
Dhj
)
+
(
rcl j − r˜ − ccl j
)
· Lcj − cn j · n j (3.14)
Since the corporate sector is monopolistically competitive, the lending rate
there is equal to the marginal cost of lending. Furthermore, the corporate market
is equally divided among all banks lending to firms. The following first–order
optimality conditions characterize the optimal choices of retail lending, retail
deposit and corporate lending rates, respectively.
E
(
Lhj
)
+
(
rhl j − r˜ − chl j
)
·
∂E
(
Lhj
)
∂rhl j
= 0 (3.15)
−E
(
Dhj
)
+
(
r˜ · (1 − φ) − rhd j − chd j
)
·
∂E
(
Dhj
)
∂rhd j
= 0 (3.16)
rcl j = c
c
l j + r˜ (3.17)
In this model there are multiple equilibria, so that the equilibrium charac-
terized by (3.15) through (3.17) is not unique. In what follows, the equilibrium
yielding the highest price (interest rate) is selected, in order to underline the role
of market power and deviation from perfect competition. Recall that N =
∑
j n j
denotes the total number of bank branches across all banks. Then let n− j de-
note the total number of competitors’ (other banks’) branches. Expressions (3.15)
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through (3.17) imply the following comparative statics results:∂rh∗l j∂chl j ;
∂rh∗l j
∂r˜
;
∂rh∗l j
∂n j
;
∂rh∗l j
∂I
 > 0 (3.18) ∂rh∗l j∂n− j ;
 < 0 (3.19)∂rh∗d j∂r˜ ; ∂r
h∗
d j
∂n− j
;
∂rc∗l j
∂ccl j
;
∂rc∗l j
∂r˜
 > 0 (3.20)∂rh∗d j∂n j ; ∂r
h∗
d j
∂cdd j
;
∂rh∗d j
∂φ
;
∂rh∗d j
∂I
 < 0 (3.21)
Let the variable cost vector Ψ evolve over time according to a discrete Mar-
kov process. Let ∆ denote the discrete set of Ψ’s. Let the monetary policy pa-
rameters (r˜; φ) evolve over time according to a discrete Markov process with Ω
denoting their discrete set. Based on the symmetric price equilibrium described
above, the value of each bank’s variable profit function is:9
pi∗j
(
R∗j; n j;∆;Ω
)
=(
rh∗l j − r˜ − chl j
)
· E
(
Lh∗j
)
+
(
r˜ · (1 − φ) − rh∗d j − chd j
)
· E
(
Dh∗j
)
+
(
rc∗l j − r˜ − ccl j
)
· Lc∗j − cn j · n j (3.22)
Equation (3.22)is used to analyze banks’ optimal choice of branch network size
in a dynamic setting.
3.3.5 Branch Network Choice
Banks simultaneously choose by how much to increase or decrease the size of
their branch network. Let a j = n
′
j − n j denote bank j’s choice of network size
9Note that the variable profit function does not contain the fixed branch network expansion
costs and scrap values.
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expansion, such that n j + a j = n′j (note that a j < 0 implies a reduction in bank
j’s branch network size). Banks choose a j with the understanding that n′j will
affect their variable profits at future periods. Let n = (n1; ...; nJ) denote the vector
of bank–specific network sizes at time t. Let Θ = (∆;Ω) denote the set of known
state variables. Then each bank’s current total profit function is
Π j (Θ; n;Ξ; ) = pi∗j (Θ; n) − z
(
a j
)
− E
(
a j
)
(3.23)
In (3.23), z
(
a j
)
is the entry cost of opening a new branch and E
(
a j
)
is the
scrap value of closing an existing branch. Both these values depend on bank–
specific idiosyncratic shocks as follows:
z
(
a j
)
= f ·
(
a j
)
+  j
E
(
a j
)
= e ·
(
a j
)
+  j
(3.24)
In (3.24), Ξ = ( f ; e) are the estimable time–varying parameters. Let  =
(1; . . . ; J) denote the vector of idiosyncratic shocks of all banks. It is assumed
that this vector is independent of the elements of Θ, and independently dis-
tributed across banks and over time. Independence across banks implies that a
bank cannot learn about other banks’ ’s by using its own private information.
Independence over time means that a bank cannot use other banks’ histories of
previous decisions to infer their current shocks. It is also assumed that the ’s
have support over the entire real line with a cumulative distribution increasing
with respect to every argument.
The profit function in (3.23) depends on Ξ, and hence bank j’s optimal choice
of branch network size expansion a∗j is also a function of the set of unknown
structural parameters.
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Markov Perfect Equilibrium
It is assumed that bank j’s strategy depends only on its payoff–relevant state
variables (Θ; n; ;Ξ). Let α ≡ α (Θ; n; ;Ξ) be a set of strategy functions, one for
each bank, such that α : {n}J × Θ × R2 → A where A = (a1; . . . ; aJ). Let ψ j denote
each bank’s value such that
ψ j (Θ; n; ;α;Ξ) = E
[
Π j
(
Θ; n j; ; a j;Ξ
)
+ υαj
(
Θ; n j; a j;Ξ
)]
(3.25)
where υαj is the expected future profits of each bank if its current decision is a j
and all the other banks, including itself, behave in the future according to their
respective strategy functions in α. That is,
υαj
(
Θ; n j; a j;Ξ
)
=
∞∑
s=1
γsEs
{
Πs j
[
Θs;αs
(
Θs; nαs ; s
)
, nαs ; s
] | Θ; a j; n j;Ξ} (3.26)
where the expectation is taken over all the possible future paths of {Θ; }. The
super–index α is used in nαs to emphasize that the evolution of future networks
of bank branches depends on the strategy functions in α. A Markov Perfect Equi-
librium (MPE) in this game is a set of strategy functions α such that each bank’s
strategy maximizes the value of the bank for each possible
(
Θ; n j; ;Ξ
)
and tak-
ing other banks’ strategies as given. That is, α is a MPE if for all banks, states(
Θ; n j; 
)
, structural parameters Ξ and Markov strategies α′,
ψ j
(
Θ; n j; ;α;Ξ
)
≥ ψ j
(
Θ; n j; ;α′j;α− j;Ξ
)
(3.27)
Given (3.23) and (3.27), it is now possible to describe the form of bank j’s branch
network choices as follows:
Change branch network size by a j = m j if, for m j , m˜ j,
− z
(
m j
) (
1 : m j > 0
)
− E
(
m j
) (
1 : m j < 0
)
+ υαj
(
Θ; a j = m j; n j;Ξ
)
≥ −z
(
m˜ j
) (
1 : m˜ j > 0
)
− E
(
m˜ j
) (
1 : m˜ j < 0
)
+ υαj
(
Θ; a j = m˜ j; n j;Ξ
)
(3.28)
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The expression in (3.28) indicates that expanding (or contracting, if m j < 0)
bank j’s network size by m j branches has greater value than choosing any other
m˜ j. Similar to the static price competition equilibrium characterized in (3.15)
through (3.17), this branch network size choice can also have multiple equilibria.
Recall that in the price competition, the equilibrium yielding the highest price
was selected, in order to underline the role of market power and deviation from
perfect competition. In the dynamic network game, the selected equilibrium is
the one that the model converges to by iterating from the initial set of values
υαj = 0 (which are the values corresponding to the γ j = 0 case). It is important to
emphasize again that from (3.28), the optimal network size choice depends on
the set of unknown structural parameters in Ξ.
3.4 Estimation
The model’s structural parameters of interest are the profit function, the dis-
count factor γ, the transition probabilities, the distribution of bank–specific pri-
vate shocks, the time–specific branch network expansion costs and scrap values.
The form of the profit function is assumed to be linear, as described above. The
constant discount factor γ is derived from lending rates over time. The distri-
bution of bank–specific private shocks is assumed to be known. Therefore, the
structural parameters that remain to be estimated are the transition probabili-
ties, the fixed branch network expansion costs and the scrap values.
The estimation method follows the two–step procedure developed in Bajari,
Benkard, and Levin (2007) along the lines of Hotz and Miller (1993). In the
first stage, the optimal interest rates and the branch network expansion choices
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are estimated as functions of all the state variables. These first–stage estimates
provide predictions for the policy functions10.
Using the policy function predictions, each bank’s value can be written as
a function of the state variables and the unknown structural parameters only.
The goal of the second stage of the estimation is to use these value functions to
find the set of structural parameters that rationalize the observed policy choices
compared to the values of multiple sub–optimal policy paths.
3.4.1 First Step: Policy Functions and Transition Probabilities
The goal of the first step of the estimation is to write each bank’s discounted sum
of profits in (3.25)) as functions of the state variables and structural parameters
only. In order to do so, it is first important to establish a mapping between
these variables and banks’ policy choices. Second, empirical estimates of the
transition probabilities of the exogenous state variables are needed.
The interest rate choices are estimated based on Equations (3.15) through
(3.17). The rates associated with each currency denomination and loan/deposit
type are estimated separately as shown in Table 3.1.
Recall from the model description that retail interest rates originate from im-
perfect spatial competition, and corporate rates are chosen in a perfectly com-
petitive market. Let m =(Retail, Mortgage) denote the type of the interest rate
10Since banks’ branching decisions depend on the setup costs and scrap values, these first–
stage policy estimates are already functions of the unknown structural parameters. This is han-
dled with an iterative formulation in the estimation.
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Table 3.1: Description of Interest Rate Types.
Retail Loan Interest Rates Mortgage Interest Rates
Hungarian Forint (HUF) Hungarian Forint (HUF)
Euro (EUR) Euro (EUR)
Swiss Franc (CHF) Swiss Franc (CHF)
Retail Deposit Rates Corporate Loan Interest Rates
Hungarian Forint (HUF) Hungarian Forint (HUF)
Euro (EUR) Euro (EUR)
offered to households. The following linear equations are estimated.
(
rhl
)m
jt
= λm0 + λ
m
1 ·
(
chl
)m
t
+ λm2 · (r˜)t + λm3 ·
∑
k, j
(n)kt + λ
m
4 · (n) jt + λm5 · (I)t + νmjt (3.29)
where
(
λm1 ; λ
m
2 ; λ
m
4 ; λ
m
5
)
> 0 and
(
λm3
)
< 0,
(
rhd
)m
jt
= ωm0 + ω
m
1 ·
(
chd
)m
t
+ ωm2 · (r˜ (1 − φ))mt + ωm3 ·
∑
k, j
(n)kt + ω
m
4 · (n) jt
+ ωm5 · (I)t + ϕmjt (3.30)
where
(
ωm2 ;ω
m
3
)
> 0 and
(
ωm1 ;ω
m
4 ;ω
m
5
)
< 0,
(
rcl
)
jt = ρ0 + ρ1 ·
(
ccl
)
t + ρ2 · (r˜)t + ψ jt (3.31)
where (ρ1; ρ2) > 0.
The proportional costs Ψ =
(
chl ; c
h
d; c
c
l
)
are common across banks and vary
over time. The elements of Ψ consist of three parts. The first part is the actual,
monetary cost associated with making loans and taking deposits. The second
term captures the currency risk associated with the given loan or deposit, and
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the third term represents expected currency appreciation. The first term (the
monetary cost) is calculated by regressing the bank-specific loan and deposit
quantities on each bank’s Total Variable Costs each period as follows:
TVC jt = %0t +
∑
m
%m1t (l)
m
jt +
∑
m
%m2t (d)
m
jt + %3t (n) jt + µ jt (3.32)
Equation (3.32) can be estimated by generalized least squares (GLS) with ap-
propriate adjustments for the panel setting. In (3.32), the coefficients %m1t and %
m
2t
capture the proportional monetary costs of making one unit’s worth of loan of
and deposit of type m. The currency risk term of the elements of Ψ is included
with the purpose of capturing the riskiness of lending in any given currency
(HUF, EUR or CHF). This currency risk is measured by calculating the volatility
of each currency against the U.S. Dollar (USD) over the six months preceding
each period t. The third term is measured as the average appreciation of the
currency of the loan/deposit against the USD six months ahead of each period
t.
Estimation of equations (3.29) through (3.31) by GLS for panel data yields
parameter vector estimates
(
λˆ; ωˆ; ρˆ
)
. The next step is then to get estimates of
the optimal branch network size choice a∗jt as a function of the state variables
and structural parameters. The observed values of a jt range from −6 to 6. This
means that at most 6 branches are closed per period, and at most 6 branches are
opened in each period. Assuming that the error term ε has the standard normal
distribution, the probability that bank j chooses to open m jt branches at time t
can be expressed using the following ordered probit formulation. Let L jt denote
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the linear equation such that11
L jt = κ0 + κ1 · (cn)t + κ2 ·
∑
k, j
(n)kt + κ3 · (I)t
+ κ4 · (n) jt + +κ5 · ( ft) + κ6 · (et) + ε jt = κ · Θ˜ jt (3.33)
Then for the M jt possible choices of how many new branches to add (in the
present case, M jt = 10), we have M jt − 1 cutoff values κ
(
m jt
)
such that
Prob
(
a jt = m jt
)
= Prob
[
κ
(
m jt − 1
)
≤ L jt ≤ κ
(
m jt
)]
= Φ
[
κ
(
m jt
)
− κ · Θ˜ jt
]
− Φ
[
κ
(
m jt − 1
)
− κ · Θ˜ jt
]
(3.34)
where Φ (·) denotes the normal CDF of the error term ε jt, and Θ˜ jt is the set of
bank j–relevant period t state variables listed in Equation (3.33). It is apparent
that the structural parameters ( f ; e)t already enter the first–stage policy func-
tions. This problem is handled by solving the model iteratively. First, the ob-
served interest rates and branch network size are used at the simulated second
stage of the estimation, in order to get initial estimates of ( f ; e)t. Then these
initial estimates are used in the estimation of Equation (3.34). These steps are
repeated until the structural parameter estimates converge.
The estimates κˆ from (3.34), together with the interest rate coefficient esti-
mates
(
λˆ; ωˆ; ρˆ
)
, can be used to construct the predicted branch network sizes and
interest rates. The predicted policy functions are then used to write each bank’s
discounted sum of profits as functions of the model’s state variables and the
structural parameters only. However, a good understanding of the evolution
of the model’s exogenous state variables is also needed before constructing the
discounted sum of expected profits. The transition probabilities of these state
11The coefficient estimate %ˆ3t from Equation (3.32) serves as data for the branch operational
cost cnt in (3.33).
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variables in Θ can be estimated directly from their observed realizations over
time.
3.4.2 Second Step: Structural Parameter Estimates
The unknown structural parameters to be estimated are the period–specific val-
ues of Ξt = ( ft; et). The structural parameters are assumed to be common across
banks, and vary over time. Let σˆ =
(
λˆ; ωˆ; ρˆ; κˆ
)
denote the vector of coefficient
estimates from the first stage. Recall that α denotes the strategy set. The dis-
counted sum of expected profits is described in (3.35) as the estimated counter-
part of (3.25).
ψ j (Θ; n; ; σˆ;α;Ξ) = E
[
Π j
(
Θ; n j; ; σˆ;α;Ξ
)
+ υσj
(
Θ; n j; σˆ;α;Ξ
)]
(3.35)
Given the estimated transition probabilities, forward simulation is used to obtain
the value function ψ j (Θ; n; ; αˆ;Ξ). For each simulation, first private shocks for
each bank j are drawn. These are used together with the simulated paths of
state variables to construct bank j’s corresponding optimal branch network size
and interest rate choices. The predicted policy functions yield Πˆ j (·). Averag-
ing bank j’s discounted sum of profits over many simulated paths yields an
estimate of ψ j (·), denoted by ψˆ j (·). Comparing these simulated profit estimates
(corresponding to banks’ observed optimal choices, denoted by α) to the simu-
lated values of many alternate paths of action (denoted by α′) can then by used
to recover the branch setup costs and scrap values as follows.
The MPE characterization above implies that at the true values of the struc-
tural parameters, denoted by Ξ0, bank j’s observed actions are optimal:
ψ j
(
n j;  j;α; σˆ;Θ;Ξ0
)
≥ ψ j
(
n j;  j;α′j;α− j; σˆ;Θ;Ξ0
)
(3.36)
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The goal is to obtain estimates Ξˆ that minimize deviations from this set of in-
equalities. It is assumed that (1) all conditions for the point identification of
the model are satisfied, and (2) the set of inequalities characterizing the optimal
choices is large. Let x denote the equilibrium conditions. The function g (x;Ξ) in
(3.37) is defined based on (3.36) as follows:
g (x;Ξ;α;σ) = ψ j
(
n j;  j;α;σ;Ξ
)
− ψ j
(
n j;  j;α′j;α− j;σ;Ξ
)
(3.37)
Let gk (x;Ξ;α;σ) denote the value of this difference for the k’th simulation, with
empirical counterpart gˆk (x;Ξ;α;σ). Let S denote the number of alternate policy
paths examined for each simulation, and K the total number of simulations.
The following Qk (Ξ) function captures deviations from the set of inequalities
described in (3.36).
Qk (σ;Ξ) =
1
S
S∑
s=1
[
min (gˆk (x;Ξ;α;σ) , 0)
]2 (3.38)
Then the best estimates of the structural parameters are such that
Ξˆ := argmin
Ξ
Qk (Ξ; σˆk) (3.39)
It is assumed that all conditions which ensure that this estimator is consistent
and asymptotically normal are satisfied. The values of S − 1 alternate paths of
action are simulated for each bank j and each simulation k. These sub–optimal
paths are chosen to represent close deviations from the optimal (observed) path
of actions. For instance, suppose that bank j opens m branches in period t. Then
the second stage of the estimation consists of simulating the value associated
with opening z + h branches instead
(
−S2 < h < S2 ; h , 0
)
. For J banks, this yields
J · (S − 1) data points per time period and simulation. Variation across sim-
ulation draws is then used to obtain the best structural parameter estimates
according to (3.39).
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3.4.3 Data
Detailed, regulatory balance sheet and interest rate data are collected by the
Pe´nzu¨gyi Szervezetek A´llami Felu¨gyelete (2004-2007) — the Hungarian Finan-
cial Supervisory Authority. Data are collected monthly on the activities of all
Hungarian commercial banks. From this database, this chapter utilizes data on
the five largest commercial banks operating in Hungary. The sample period is
January 2004 through November 2007. Therefore, there are 47 · 5 = 235 data
points in the panel for each type of bank activity.
Data on the choice (dependent) variables of the model (such as the inter-
est rates and the branch network sizes) are directly available from the regu-
latory data set. Data on the state (explanatory) variables come from various
sources. Data for marginal costs are estimated from the Total Variable Cost re-
gression described in Equation (3.32) using confidential data on costs. Data on
interbank lending rates, as well as required reserve ratios and other macro–
level bank data, were collected from the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2004-2007).
Data on income, population, and market characteristics come from the Ko¨zponti
Statisztikai Hivatal (2004-2007). All quantities are reported in millions of HUF,
which are converted to real terms using the GDP deflator. All the estimates are
converted to elasticities, which are reported in Section 3.5.
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3.5 Estimation Results
3.5.1 Interest Rates and Branch Network Choices
The following tables show the estimation results for the policy functions — cor-
responding to the first stage of the estimation. The results for the choices of
optimal interest rates are described first, by type of interest rate.
Table 3.2 confirms that the retail lending rate estimation results are generally
in line with the model’s predictions. Accordingly, the interbank lending rate,
marginal costs and the size of the own branch network have strong positive ef-
fects, and competitors’ branch network size has a significant negative impact
on banks’ choice of retail lending rates. The results are the strongest for the
HUF retail rates, and weaker for the EUR and CHF rates. It is interesting to
note that per capita income — which the model predicts would be positively
related to the choice of retail loan rates — appears with a negative sign for HUF
and EUR loans. Furthermore, results show that as the currency of lending ap-
preciates against the U.S. dollar, retail lending rates fall. The sign of this ef-
fect is in line with the predictions of Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP). However,
UIP would imply that the coefficients on ”E–R Appreciation” (against the USD)
should equal one — which is clearly not the case.
Table 3.3 shows that the interbank lending and borrowing rates enter strongly
and positively for both the deposit rates and the corporate lending rates. This
is in line with the model’s predictions. The predicted effect of branch network
size is strongly confirmed by the data — banks with more branches set lower de-
posit rates. Greater branch network of competitors cause banks to offer higher
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Table 3.2: Retail Loan Interest Rates: Elasticities.
Explanatory HUF Loan EUR Loan CHF Loan
Variables Rate Elast Rate Elast Rate Elast
Interbank Loan Rate 0.25∗∗(0.06) 0.12 (.27) 0.22 (.17)
Per Capita Income −0.64∗(.31) −0.59 (.67) 0.30 (78)
Currency Volatility −0.01 (0.04) 0.04 (.09) 0.16∗∗(.07)
E-R Appreciation −0.33∗∗∗(.14) −0.04 (.12) −0.21∗∗(.10)
Own Branch Number 0.08∗∗∗(.03) 0.12∗(.06) 0.47∗∗∗(.61)
Competitors’ Branches −0.37∗∗∗(.10) −0.12 (.27) −0.06 (.84)
MC of Lending 0.12∗(.07) −0.66 (.76) 0.45 (.75)
deposit rates. Marginal costs have strong impacts on both the deposit and cor-
porate rates. Currency volatility increases the lending rates that banks charge
to firms. As expected, deposit rates decrease as the currency of deposits ap-
preciates (in line with UIP), limiting arbitrage opportunities for banking clients.
However, UIP fails again in that the estimated coefficients are far from unity. It
is surprising that currency appreciation causes banks to charge higher rates to
corporate customers.
Table 3.4 shows that a higher interbank rate has a strong positive impact
on banks’ mortgage rate choices, regardless of the currency. Per capita income
appears to have a positive impact on mortgage rates. Having more branches
allows banks to charge higher mortgage rates, while more branches of competi-
tors cause them to charge lower rates. The marginal cost of lending increases
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Table 3.3: Deposit Rates and Corporate Loan Interest Rates: Elasticities.
Explanatory HUF Dep EUR Dep HUF Firm EUR Firm
Variables Rate Elast Rate Elast Rate Elast Rate Elast
Interbank Loan Rate − − 0.70∗∗∗(.00) 0.60∗∗∗(.12)
Interbank Deposit Rate 0.95∗∗∗(.03) 0.62∗∗(.26) − −
Per Capita Income 0.34∗(.19) −0.13 (.42) − −
Currency Volatility −0.01 (.02) −0.02 (.08) 0.01∗∗∗(.00) 0.25∗∗∗(.04)
E-R Appreciation −0.41∗∗∗(.14)−1.19∗(.75) 0.08∗∗∗(.02) 1.10∗∗∗(.27)
Own Branch Number −0.02∗∗(.01) −0.08∗(.04) − −
Competitors’ Branches 0.50∗∗∗(.10)−0.02 (.18) − −
MC of Lending − − 0.48∗∗∗(.03) 0.08 (.07)
MC of Deposits −0.99 (.36) −0.24 (.22) − −
mortgage rates of all currencies significantly. As expected, currency appreci-
ation enters the choice of all mortgage rates with a negative sign (in line with
UIP). However, none of the coefficients on currency appreciation are significant.
Section 3.4 describes the ordered probit estimation of banks’ choice of branch
network expansion. Instead of reporting the elasticities of each branch expan-
sion choice one by one, it is more informative to separate banks’ branch network
decisions into two categories: the decision to open or close branches. Table 3.5
presents the results of the probit estimation — the effects of the model’s state
variables on the probability of branch network expansion.
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Table 3.4: Mortgage Interest Rates: Elasticities.
Explanatory HUF Mort EUR Mort CHF Mort
Variables Rate Elast Rate Elast Rate Elast
Interbank Loan Rate 0.47∗∗∗(.06) 1.73∗∗(.71) 0.40 (.27)
Per Capita Income −0.10 (.30) 3.22∗∗∗(0.94) 2.49∗(1.43)
Currency Volatility 0.08∗∗(.04) −0.06 (.19) −0.20∗(.12)
E-R Appreciation −0.06 (.27) −1.83 (1.72) −1.55 (1.14)
Own Branch Number 0.08∗∗∗(.03) 0.23∗∗(.10) 1.95 (1.17)
Competitors’ Branches −0.13 (.14) −1.49∗∗∗(.27) 2.05 (1.41)
MC of Lending 0.96∗(.52) 0.31 (.41) 0.75 (1.20)
Table 3.5: Branch Network Expansion Probability: Elasticities.
Explanatory Variables Branch Opening Probability
Own Branch Number −0.26∗∗∗(.11)
Competitors’ Branches 1.21∗∗(.55)
Branch Oper. Cost −0.20 (.44)
Per Capita Income 2.30∗(1.24)
Branch Setup Cost −1.11∗∗(.52)
Branch Scrap Value 1.14∗∗(.51)
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Table 3.5 confirms that having a bigger branch network reduces the proba-
bility that banks would choose to add new branches. However, more branches
of competitors induce banks to expand their own branch network. Branch oper-
ational costs (incorporating variable day to day costs of operation) have a weak
negative effect. Greater per capita income (potentially a proxy for the demand
for banking services) has a significant positive impact on the probability that
banks add new branches. As expected, the fixed per–branch setup costs (incor-
porating values of real estate and equipment) have a significant negative, while
the scrap value of branches has a significant positive impact on the probability
that banks expand their branch network size.
3.5.2 Branch Setup Costs and Scrap Values
With the policy function estimates in hand, forward simulation is used to ob-
tain values for banks’ discounted expected sum of profits. Transition probabil-
ities for the time–varying exogenous state variables are estimated first. These
variables are per capita income, the currency volatilities and appreciations, the
interbank rates, the branch network size of competitors, the marginal costs and
the branch operational costs. Second stage estimates of branch setup costs and
scrap values are derived using the transition probabilities and the first–stage
policy function estimates. The month–by–month setup cost and scrap value es-
timates are summarized in Table 3.6 and detailed in Table 3.7. Figure 3.8 depicts
the estimates over time. On average, the setup cost of a branch is 2.48 times big-
ger than its scrap value. Since the growth rates of branch setup costs and scrap
values are 2.03 percent and 1.83 percent respectively, the discrepancy between
the two is growing over the sample period.
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Figure 3.8: Estimated Branch Setup Costs and Scrap Values Over Time.
Table 3.6: Summary Statistics (Millions of HUF).
Parameter Min 25p 50p 75p Max Mean Std Dev
Setup Cost 80.00 107.86 147.23 182.03 218.43 148.81 41.92
Scrap Value 60.00 83.70 110.43 129.63 149.54 109.48 25.37
Table 3.7: Branch Setup Cost and Scrap Value Estimates (Millions of HUF).
Time Period Branch Setup Cost Branch Scrap Value
Jan 04 80.00∗∗∗(.18) 60.00∗∗∗(1.53)
Feb 04 100.51∗∗∗(.27) 80.01∗∗(37.97)
Mar 04 101.68∗∗∗(.44) 80.86∗∗∗(18.63)
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Table 3.7: (Continued)
Time Period Branch Setup Cost Branch Scrap Value
Apr 04 103.07∗∗∗(.54) 80.51 (212.51)
May 04 104.60∗∗∗(.48) 81.03 (155.75)
June 04 106.00∗∗∗(.59) 81.78 (123.38)
July 04 107.39∗∗∗(.70) 82.64 (122.52)
Aug 04 107.86∗∗∗(1.18) 83.16∗∗∗(23.76)
Sept 04 107.86∗∗∗(1.43) 83.13∗∗∗(30.25)
Oct 04 107.86∗∗∗(1.18) 84.58∗∗∗(22.02)
Nov 04 107.86∗∗∗(1.17) 83.70∗∗∗(21.34)
Dec 04 107.86∗∗∗(1.28) 82.83∗∗∗(19.37)
Jan 05 107.40∗∗∗(3.08) 84.39∗∗∗(31.97)
Feb 05 106.48∗∗∗(6.12) 83.90 (95.76)
Mar 05 105.10∗∗∗(4.63) 83.14∗∗∗(13.28)
Apr 05 109.29∗∗∗(3.19) 86.15∗∗∗(19.62)
May 05 116.75∗∗∗(1.19) 88.52∗∗∗(15.38)
June 05 126.38∗∗∗(1.38) 97.43 (81.12)
July 05 137.09∗∗∗(3.64) 102.94∗∗∗(13.72)
Aug 05 147.23∗∗∗(1.96) 110.43∗∗∗(16.91)
Sept 05 155.13∗∗∗(4.56) 115.86 (156.58)
Oct 05 158.86∗∗∗(5.79) 118.06 (152.53)
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Table 3.7: (Continued)
Time Period Branch Setup Cost Branch Scrap Value
Nov 05 158.86∗∗∗(6.01) 118.06 (100.93)
Dec 05 158.86∗∗∗(6.78) 118.06 (86.94)
Jan 06 158.86∗∗∗(8.70) 118.06 (151.06)
Feb 06 158.86∗∗∗(10.28) 118.06 (332.71)
Mar 06 157.67∗∗∗(8.87) 117.12 (195.01)
Apr 06 151.56∗∗∗(8.94) 113.03∗(67.60)
May 06 142.90∗∗∗(14.68) 107.31 (138.27)
June 06 133.52∗∗∗(8.73) 101.16 (139.56)
July 06 137.70∗∗∗(8.17) 102.34 (111.63)
Aug 06 123.25∗∗∗(13.60) 108.70 (100.37)
Sept 06 158.82∗∗∗(12.53) 115.12 (88.44)
Oct 06 167.93∗∗∗(13.27) 120.52 (92.76)
Nov 06 175.26∗∗∗(16.26) 125.27 (81.22)
Dec 06 182.03∗∗∗(4.91) 129.63 (70.28)
Jan 07 188.98∗∗∗(9.77) 133.95 (135.63)
Feb 07 196.59∗∗∗(11.76) 138.54 (85.84)
Mar 07 204.79∗∗∗(25.50) 143.35∗∗∗(14.86)
Apr 07 214.48∗∗∗(11.14) 148.21∗∗∗(18.59)
May 07 218.42∗∗∗(13.17) 149.54∗∗∗(23.56)
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Table 3.7: (Continued)
Time Period Branch Setup Cost Branch Scrap Value
June 07 218.42∗∗∗(8.08) 149.54∗∗∗(25.72)
July 07 218.42∗∗∗(11.26) 149.54∗∗∗(18.77)
Aug 07 218.42∗∗∗(9.67) 149.54∗∗∗(27.01)
Sept 07 218.42∗∗∗(9.94) 149.54∗∗∗(54.88)
Oct 07 214.94∗∗∗(8.15) 146.68∗∗(69.74)
Nov 07 203.65∗∗∗(9.46) 139.44∗(76.19)
Table 3.8 shows the relationship between measures of the cost of construc-
tion, and estimates of the branch setup costs and scrap values. Setup cost and
scrap value estimates are strongly positively correlated, and both move closely
with relevant producer price indices.
Table 3.8: Correlations.
Measures Setup Cost Scrap Value
Scrap Value 0.99∗∗∗
Manufacturing PPI 0.89∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗
Industrial PPI 0.92∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
Investment PPI 0.88∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗
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3.6 Simulation Exercises
This section explores the impact of increasing various model parameters on
banks’ optimal behavior. In particular, arc elasticities of bank interest rate and
branch network size choices with respect to setup costs, consumer income, and
competitors’ branch network size are reported.
3.6.1 Increasing Branch Setup Costs
This subsection examines the effect of a one–time increase in the initial value of
branch setup cost on the behavior of the average bank throughout the course
of the sample period. Figure 3.9 displays the negative relationship between
setup cost increases and the arc elasticity of the probability of branch network
expansion. The arc elasticity is small, and decreasing in magnitude – implying
that expansion probabilities are concave in setup costs.
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Figure 3.9: Elasticity of Branch Opening Probability w.r.t. Setup Cost.
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3.6.2 Increasing Consumer Income
This exercise explores the effects of gradual percent increases in per capita con-
sumer income on indicators of bank profitability and bank behavior. Increases
in income impact the choices of all interest rates, as well the the size of the
branch network. Figure 3.10 explores the impact of increases in per capita in-
come on the average bank’s Net Interest Income (NII), a common measure of
profitability. It shows that at low levels of initial income, a 1 percent increase in
income raises NII by 2.5 percent over the length of the sample period (strongly
elastic). However, this arc elasticity decreases with income, to a steady level of
0.25 in the inelastic range – implying that NII is increasing concave in consumer
income.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Percent Increase in Per Capita Income
El
as
tic
ity
 
 
Elast. of Bank Net Interest
Income w.r.t Consumer Inc.
Figure 3.10: Elasticity of Net Interest Income w.r.t. Per Capita Consumer
Income.
Figure 3.11 explores the effect of increases in income on the elasticity of the
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average bank’s own branch network size. The depicted positive relationship is
in line with the results presented in Table 3.5. The per capita income arc elas-
ticity of branch network size increases from 0.31 to 0.35 as income increases
(consistently in the inelastic range) — implying that branch network size is in-
creasing convex in consumer income.
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Figure 3.11: Elasticity of Branch Network Size w.r.t. Per Capita Consumer
Income.
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Figure 3.12: Elasticities of Interest Rates w.r.t. Per Capita Consumer In-
come.
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Figure 3.12 shows the impact of income increases on banks’ choices of inter-
est rates. Both the average retail lending and deposit rates respond negatively to
rises in income, depicting a negative concave relationship. Mortgage rates, on
the other hand, are strongly elastic and increasing convex in consumer income.
These results are in line with the estimates presented in Section 3.5.
3.6.3 Increasing Competitors’ Branch Network Size
This simulation exercise explores the impact of increases in competitors’ branch
network size on the average bank’s optimal behavior. Figure 3.13 shows how
the average bank’s Net Interest Income (NII) responds to increases in the branch
network size of competitors. At the observed numbers of competitors’ branches,
a 1 percent increase in their network size causes average bank NII to fall by
over 8 percent. However, this negative impact dampens quickly as competitors’
network size rises. In fact, at numbers twice as big as the observed values,
the response of average bank NII to rises in competitors’ branch network size
becomes positive.
Figure 3.14 shows the impact of competitors’ branch network size on the
own network size of the average bank. This effect is weakly positive, and
greater at higher levels of competitors’ network size (in the 0.23 to 0.25 range) —
implying an increasing convex relationship in line with Table 3.5. It appears that
branch network competition becomes more intense when the overall branch
network is greater.
Figure 3.15 depicts the impact of rises in competitors’ branch network size
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Figure 3.13: Elasticity of Net Interest Income w.r.t. Competitors’ Branch
Network Size.
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Figure 3.14: Elasticity of Branch Network Size w.r.t. Competitors’ Branch
Network Size.
on the average bank’s choices of interest rates. As expected, the average bank
offers higher deposit rates and demands lower loan rates as the number of com-
petitors’ branches increases. Mortgage rates, however, respond positively on
average. This is due to the strong positive elasticity of CHF mortgages which
outweighs the negative response of HUF and EUR mortgages, as described in
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Section 3.5 above.
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Figure 3.15: Elasticity of Interest Rates w.r.t. Competitors’ Branch Net-
work Size.
Comparing the effects of increases in per capita consumer income and com-
petitors’ branch network size, it is interesting to note that the signs of the im-
pacts are very similar (with the notable exception of the response of retail lend-
ing rates). However, the magnitudes are rather different. The effects of per
capita consumer income increases are consistently greater than the impacts of
increases in competitors’ branch network size.
3.7 Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a thorough examination of the com-
petitive behavior of Hungarian commercial banks in a dynamic framework. The
study presented in this chapter contributes to the previous literature by incorpo-
rating branch network competition (in addition to interest rate competition) of
imperfectly competitive commercial banks in a dynamic setting. Furthermore,a
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model–based approach is used to estimate structural parameters (branch setup
costs and scrap values) that so far have been only approximated by ad hoc em-
pirical measures.
The chapter develops a model of branch network and interest rate competi-
tion, where banks simultaneously make retail lending, mortgage, deposit inter-
est rate, as well as branch network size decisions. Banks take into account the
impact of their choices on their future profits. Banks’ optimal interest rate and
branch network size choices are characterized in the Salop competition frame-
work. Comparative statics predictions about the impact of the model’s state
variables (such as marginal costs, branch operational costs, interbank rates) on
banks’ optimal choices are derived. A version of the Bajari, Benkard, and Levin
(2007) two–stage estimation method is developed to estimate the policy equa-
tions, and to obtain estimates of the branch setup costs and scrap values.
Results corresponding to the first stage of the estimation (the static policy
function estimates) show that own and competitors’ branch network sizes have
a strong impact on banks’ interest rate choices. This finding confirms the con-
clusions of the previous literature (Dick, 2007; Spieker, 2004) that consumers
care much about the proximity and availability of bank branches (which banks
charge a premium for). When competitors have more branches, the average
bank compensates by lowering its lending rates and paying higher rates on
deposits. Furthermore, banks’ propensity to build new branches decreases in
the size of their existing network. Competition in bank branch network size is
confirmed by the result that greater branch network size of competitors induce
banks to expand their own network as well. Furthermore, banks add fewer new
branches if their operation is more expensive, and if branches cost more to build.
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Banks are more likely to add new branches if the scrap values are high.
The second stage of the dynamic estimation obtains estimates of the fixed
setup costs (and scrap values) of bank branch network expansion (and contrac-
tion). The per–bank setup cost (with an average of approximately 150 million
HUF, or about 0.75 million USD) is 2.48 times greater than the mean scrap value
(with an average of 110 million HUF, or approximately 0.55 million USD). As
branch setup costs grow faster than scrap values, the discrepancy between the
two is growing over the sample period.
Simulation exercises are conducted to examine the impacts of rises in branch
setup costs, per capita consumer income and competitors’ branch network size
on the optimal behavior of the average bank. Branch setup costs only have a
very small negative impact on bank profitability (as measured by Net Interest
Income), and negligible effect on interest rates. The choice of branch network
size has a negative response, as expected. Rising per capita consumer income
and competitors’ branch network size have strong effects on bank behavior —
confirming the important roles of consumer traits (the demand side) and com-
petitive behavior (the supply side). This chapter provides a careful study of the
credit supply side — a contribution to a literature that focuses heavily on the
demand (consumer) side of banking in Hungary. The results presented in this
paper can therefore have important policy implications from the perspective of
bank regulators.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 2
A.1 Data Appendix
Initial Capitalization. Data on Initial capitalization come from the FFIEC Coun-
try Exposure Surveys. For each bank size category, the reported Total Assets are
divided by the number of banks to get a value for the average bank representa-
tive of the given bank size category. The data are reported in million USD, and
are converted into real terms using 2005 Q4 as the base. Values are in log of
million USD.
Expected Loan and Deposit Rate Indices. Data used for the variables αi and
βi are market–specific loan and deposit rate indices, collected from Economist
Intelligence Unit (1997-2005)’s Country Data . Averages of these α’s and β in-
dices are taken over a 3–quarter rolling window, in order to represent the bank’s
expectation of these values.
Proportional Lending and Deposit Costs. Total Costs are regressed on loan
and deposit volumes and a constant in each market. The coefficients on the
affiliate loan and deposit volumes are used as measures of proportional lending
and deposit costs, respectively. Cross–border lending cost is measured as the
coefficient on cross–border loans in the U.S. Total Cost regression.
Proportional Income Tax Rates and Basic Borrowing Costs. Since data on
tax rates applicable to bank income are not available, these tax rates are approx-
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Table A.1: Loan & Deposit Averages by Country Over Time (log millions
of 2005 Q4 USD).
Code Aff. Loan CB Loan Dep. Code Aff. Loan CB Loan Dep.
AR 4.79 4.80 5.20 JA 4.87 5.45 4.58
AU 4.92 4.90 5.00 LU 2.50 3.86 4.38
AT 1.57 4.63 1.68 MY 2.87 2.79 2.72
BE 2.01 5.18 3.00 MX 4.77 5.88 4.47
BR 6.78 5.72 6.89 NL 2.16 6.08 3.02
BG 2.52 0.85 2.96 NZ 3.85 2.56 3.12
CA 6.30 5.80 6.05 NO 1.99 3.86 1.12
CL 5.86 4.19 5.85 PH 5.43 3.88 5.41
CN 4.21 3.29 3.33 PL 6.38 1.71 6.28
CO 4.51 3.73 4.23 PT 4.55 3.31 4.68
CZ 5.22 1.22 5.59 RO 3.85 0.51 3.93
DK 1.13 4.73 0.81 RU 4.39 2.81 4.26
FI −0.34 3.11 −0.05 SG 3.51 4.34 4.64
FR 2.54 5.99 2.41 SK 4.44 1.14 4.38
DE 4.02 6.50 4.25 ZA 5.64 3.09 5.96
GR 6.14 3.21 6.46 KR 4.22 5.11 2.95
HU 5.00 1.11 5.18 ES 4.30 4.47 3.62
IS −1.29 0.98 −1.15 SE 2.14 4.65 1.52
IN 6.44 3.59 6.83 CH. 2.66 5.08 2.28
ID 5.35 3.06 5.69 TH 2.02 2.74 1.86
IE 3.15 4.60 3.42 TR 5.17 4.20 5.04
IL 4.38 3.69 3.91 UK 7.13 7.21 7.46
IT 4.02 5.05 2.98 US 11.57 − 11.57
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Table A.2: Loan & Deposit Averages by Time Period Across Countries (log
millions of 2005 Q4 USD).
Time Aff Loans CB Loans Deps Time Aff Loans CB Loans Deps
97/12 4.38 3.59 4.42 02/03 4.15 3.98 4.21
98/03 4.29 3.65 4.43 02/06 4.13 3.96 4.42
98/06 4.18 3.74 4.13 02/09 4.16 3.95 4.31
98/09 4.27 3.69 4.40 02/12 4.35 3.91 4.31
98/12 4.31 3.67 4.44 03/12 4.45 3.92 4.36
99/12 4.36 3.66 4.22 03/06 4.43 3.96 4.37
99/06 4.24 3.71 4.45 03/09 4.35 4.00 4.37
99/12 4.39 3.73 4.60 03/12 4.38 4.09 4.41
99/12 4.47 3.67 4.51 04/03 4.29 4.11 4.26
00/03 3.83 3.66 4.16 04/06 4.46 4.15 4.33
00/06 4.52 3.08 4.09 04/09 4.77 4.24 4.06
00/09 4.12 3.80 3.81 04/12 4.66 4.17 4.46
00/12 4.31 3.69 3.94 05/12 4.54 4.26 4.48
01/03 4.31 3.80 3.99 05/06 4.25 4.20 4.41
01/06 4.27 3.95 4.43 05/09 4.51 4.31 4.54
01/09 4.10 3.92 4.22 05/12 4.45 4.30 4.86
01/12 3.19 3.98 3.11
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Table A.3: Summary of Explanatory Variables.
Variable Name Note Empirical Measure
Cross-Border Loan in i licb j Bank’s CB claims in i, mill 2005 USD
Affiliate Loan in i lia j Bank’s claims in i, mill 2005 USD
Foreign Aff Dep’ in i dij Bank’s FA liabs in i, mill 2005 USD
Bank Scope S j Lagged Sharpe Ratio
Initial Bank Capital K j Bank’s Total Assets, mill 2005 USD
Expected Aff α¯ia Mean of predicted aff loan
Loan market return in i mkt return in i over 3-qtr window
Expected Deposit β¯ia Mean of predicted deposit
market return in i mkt return in i over 3-qtr window
Expected CB Loan α¯icb Mean of predicted CB loan
market return in i mkt return in i over 3-qtr window
Lending Cost cil j Stock mkt Return in i - ROA
Deposit-taking cost cid Deposit rate - money mkt rate
Income Tax Rate ti Corporate Tax Rate in i
Req. Reserve Ratio in i δi Required Reserve Ratio in i
Bank’s Risk Aversion λ j Estimated from Model
Capital Adequacy k¯i Minimum Cap. Ratio in i
Basic Cost of Other r¯i
∆
Basic ’riskless’ interest rate set by
Borrowing in i the monetary authority in i
Loan Deman Elast.  im Estimated Coefficient
Deposit S. Elast in Deposit ηi Estimated Coefficient
Regulator’s Risk Avers. in i θi Estimated from Model
Entry Cost & Scrap Value in i Γi Estimated from Model
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imated with corporate income tax rates taken from the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (1997-2005)’s database. The basic cost
of non–deposit borrowing is measured using the country–specific equivalent of
the federal funds rate, set by the monetary authority in market i (the equivalent
of the federal funds rate). Data on these interest rates are collected from the
International Monetary Fund (1997-2005)’s International Financial Statistics.
Required Reserve Ratio and Minimum Capital Ratio. Data on market–
specific required reserve ratios and minimum capital ratios are collected from
the World Bank (1997-2005)’s Bank Regulation and Supervision database. Where
not available, the ratios are directly taken from national central banks’ websites.
Data on Loan Demand and Deposit Supply Elasticities. Taking logs of the
Dixit-Stiglitz form of the loan demand equation yields: log lim = logαim −  i · rilm
where rilm is the lending rate in market m. The coefficient 
i
m from this regres-
sion is used as loan demand elasticity. Similarly, the deposit supply equation is
log di = log βi + ηi · rid , from which the deposit supply elasticity in country i is
measured as the coefficient ηi.
Bank Scope. Initial bank scope is measured as the lagged Sharpe ratio.
Loan & Deposit Volumes. Tables A.1 and A.2 present averages of the loans
& deposits by country and by time period, respectively. Table A.3 summarizes
notation and empirical measures used for the explanatory variables in this chap-
ter.
Summary Statistics. Table A.4 presents summary statistics.
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Table A.4: Summary Statistics of Variables.
Name Min 25p 50p 75p Max Std Dev
Log of CB Loans −4.25 1.85 4.25 6.13 9.06 2.85
Log of Affil Loans −4.44 1.58 4.99 6.70 13.58 3.52
Log of Affil Dep’s −4.44 1.37 5.11 6.71 13.61 3.59
Log of Bank Capital 9.60 9.99 10.39 12.99 13.84 1.47
Exp. Loan market 1.38 5.60 8.30 13.30 97.7 15.21
return in i
Exp. Deposit 0.06 2.25 3.67 7.75 87.36 10.64
return in i
Exp. CB Loan 0.02 2.7 4.59 7.67 174.72 12.80
return in i
Proportional Cost 0.09 0.38 0.72 1.79 30.21 2.76
Income Tax Rate 10 28 33 35.70 57.5 7.38
Req Reserve Ratio 0 2 4 10 34 7.51
Min Capital Ratio 8 8 8 8 16 1.45
Nondep Borrow Cost 0 4.24 5.40 8.26 105.72 12.87
Affil Loan Elast in i 0 .05 0.27 0.55 8.68 1.27
Dep Supply Elast 0 0.06 0.30 1.15 2.96 0.78
CB Loan Elast 0 0.05 0.09 0.19 1.99 0.32
Lag Sharpe Ratio 2.78 3.23 3.32 3.70 3.78 0.27
Sharpe Ratio
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 3
B.1 Model Appendix
Using the optimality condition in (3.15), the Implicit Function Theorem implies
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(B.1)
In all of the derivatives in Equation (B.1), the denominators are negative due
to the second–order condition for a maximum holding. Equation (3.12) implies
that the numerator in the top row of (B.1) is positive. Therefore, bank j’s own
rate increases in the number of branches it operates. By the law of demand, the
numerator in the second row of (B.1) is positive — therefore, the optimal retail
lending rate increases in both the interbank lending rate and the marginal cost
of retail lending. Equation (3.12) implies that the numerator in the third row of
(B.1) is negative — therefore, larger branch network size by other banks causes
bank j to lower its optimal choice of the retail lending rate. In the bottom row
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of Equation (B.1), the sign of the numerator is positive — therefore, higher per
capita income leads to higher lending rates.
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(B.2)
In all the derivatives in Equation (B.2), the denominators are negative due
to the second-order condition for a maximum holding. Equation (3.13) implies
that the numerator in the top row of Equation (B.2) is negative. Therefore, bank
j’s own deposit rate decreases in the number of branches it operates. By the law
of supply, the numerator in the second row is positive — therefore, the optimal
deposit rate increases in the interbank rate. By the same reasoning, the numer-
ator in the third row of Equation (B.2) is negative — implying that the opti-
mal deposit rate decreases in the marginal cost of retail lending. Equation(3.13)
implies that the numerator in the fourth row of Equation (B.2) is positive —
therefore, larger branch network size of competitors causes bank j to increase
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its optimal choice of the retail deposit rate. Finally, the numerator in the bottom
row of Equation (B.2) is negative, implying that an increase in per capita income
causes bank j to lower its optimal retail deposit rate.
B.2 Data Appendix
This section gives a detailed description of the data used in the estimation of the
model.
Interest Rates. Bank–level data on interest rates come from the PSzA´F regu-
latory database. Interest rates are measured by the Effective Annual Percentage
Rate (APR) for loans, and Effective Annual Percentage Yield (APY) for deposits.
These measures are calculated on an annual basis, and also account for fees.
Bank Branch Network Size. Bank–level data come from the PSzA´F regula-
tory database. Data on the total number of bank branches in Hungary comes
from the online database of Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2004-2007). Data on com-
petitors’ branch network size are calculated using both these sources.
Interbank Rates and Reserve Requirements. Data come from the MNB.
CurrencyVolatilities andAppreciation. Volatilities of the Hungarian Forint,
the Swiss Franc and the Euro are measured as the standard deviation of the ex-
change rate between these currencies and the U.S. Dollar over the six months
preceding the period. Exchange rate data come from the MNB.
Per Capita Income. Data come from the Hungarian KSH’s online database.
Bank Discount Factor and Proportional Costs. Bank–specific discount fac-
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tors are calculated from data on lending rates. The average discount factor over
the sample period is 0.924. Branch operational cost (cn)t is the %3t term from
the Total Variable Cost equation in (3.32). All other proportional costs are also
coefficients from (3.32).
Table B.1: Summary Statistics.
Name Min 25p 50p 75p Max Mean S.D.
HUF Loan Rate 8.46 19.30 23.06 27.82 35.40 23.55 5.18
EUR Loan Rate 2.58 9.02 12.62 15.23 21.06 12.26 4.08
CHF Loan Rate 3.91 7.48 10.21 12.73 18.49 10.52 3.40
HUF Mort. Rate 4.75 10.55 12.21 14.54 27.82 12.64 3.31
EUR Mort. Rate 0.79 5.70 6.87 7.70 11.24 6.74 1.70
CHF Mort. Rate 1.57 4.62 5.32 6.08 8.07 5.34 1.12
HUF Firm Rate 6.82 8.36 9.23 11.68 13.74 9.90 1.98
EUR Firm Rate 2.20 3.40 3.94 4.68 5.73 4.03 0.87
HUF Dep. Rate 3.22 5.84 6.90 8.51 11.78 7.39 2.02
EUR Dep. Rate 0.01 1.27 1.97 2.75 10.02 2.24 1.97
HUF Volatility 1.12 2.11 2.76 3.94 5.15 3.03 1.09
EUR Volatility 0.75 1.59 2.17 3.22 5.21 2.44 1.02
CHF Volatility 0.96 1.39 1.86 3.00 4.56 2.31 1.03
HUF Appreciation 0.96 0.98 1.01 1.03 1.05 1.01 0.03
EUR Appreciation 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.01 0.02
CHF Appreciation 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.02 1.06 1.00 0.02
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Table B.1: (Continued)
Name Min 25p 50p 75p Max Mean S.D.
MC of Retail Loans 19.61 21.03 22.41 23.20 24.00 21.99 1.25
MC of Mortgages 8.17 8.76 9.34 9.67 10 9.16 0.52
MC of Deposits 1.63 1.75 1.86 1.93 2.00 1.83 0.10
Own Branch (100’s) 0.32 0.68 1.53 1.82 4.33 1.72 1.30
Competitors’ 7.06 10.57 11.26 12.96 14.66 11.42 18.84
Branches (100’s)
Per capita Income 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.01
Branch Oper. Cost 12.76 17.50 19.54 21.24 32.37 19.51 3.53
Branch Expansion −6 0 1 1 6 0.67 1.74
Table B.2: Summary of Interest Rates by Time Period.
Time HUF EUR CHF HUF EUR HUF EUR CHF HUF EUR
Loan Loan Loan Firm Firm Mor Mor Mor Dep Dep
04/01 22.43 − − 11.68 − 13.90 − − 9.03 −
04/02 24.64 − − 12.91 − 15.76 − − 10.01 −
04/03 25.39 − − 13.68 − 19.81 − − 11.07 −
04/04 26.85 − − 13.74 − 17.45 − − 10.61 −
04/05 26.12 − − 12.84 − 15.83 − − 10.09 −
04/06 26.45 − − 13.45 − 16.82 − − 10.50 −
124
Table B.2: (Continued)
Time HUF EUR CHF HUF EUR HUF EUR CHF HUF EUR
Loan Loan Loan Firm Firm Mor Mor Mor Dep Dep
04/07 26.73 − − 13.48 − 16.39 − − 10.56 −
04/08 27.32 − − 13.63 − 16.62 − − 10.86 −
04/09 27.61 − − 13.15 − 14.24 − − 9.90 −
04/10 26.86 − − 12.45 − 14.23 − − 9.35 −
04/11 26.89 − − 12.44 − 14.53 − − 9.25 −
04/12 29.21 − − 12.07 − 14.05 − − 9.21 −
05/01 26.15 10.54 9.37 10.86 2.85 13.40 6.58 5.66 8.12 0.61
05/02 24.74 11.23 10.19 10.67 3.15 13.10 6.35 5.39 7.67 0.93
05/03 24.16 13.91 10.21 9.77 2.87 12.67 6.53 5.48 7.22 2.51
05/04 22.61 10.85 10.23 9.23 2.80 12.05 8.46 5.16 6.37 0.67
05/05 22.68 10.08 11.44 9.13 2.98 13.18 6.53 4.85 6.53 0.90
05/06 23.00 12.18 10.62 9.2 3.31 13.26 6.64 5.51 6.43 1.14
05/07 20.39 10.93 11.11 9.2 3.57 15.38 6.97 5.82 6.13 1.56
05/08 20.88 13.12 10.62 9.26 4.00 14.50 7.53 6.18 6.44 1.88
05/09 23.93 11.46 10.30 8.27 3.40 12.64 7.04 5.65 5.47 2.29
05/10 21.36 11.55 10.13 8.32 3.76 12.09 7.19 6.28 5.18 1.46
05/11 22.73 11.91 9.7 8.09 3.51 10.81 5.95 5.77 6.22 1.35
05/12 22.63 10.67 10.14 8.23 3.90 10.83 6.57 5.88 5.70 1.72
06/01 21.92 11.42 10.20 8.08 3.82 10.96 7.27 5.77 5.56 1.68
06/02 23.10 11.53 10.82 7.95 3.74 10.86 7.42 5.66 5.42 1.53
06/03 22.58 13.21 10.97 7.55 3.50 11.05 7.06 5.31 5.08 1.20
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Table B.2: (Continued)
Time HUF EUR CHF HUF EUR HUF EUR CHF HUF EUR
Loan Loan Loan Firm Firm Mor Mor Mor Dep Dep
06/04 24.03 9.58 10.97 7.44 3.46 9.78 6.21 5.09 4.93 1.23
06/05 22.70 10.88 10.25 7.19 3.19 9.26 5.38 4.83 4.81 0.92
06/06 22.41 11.99 11.30 7.98 4.10 10.82 6.40 5.56 5.35 1.86
06/07 22.88 14.44 10.97 8.36 4.33 10.94 8.01 4.88 6.37 2.15
06/08 22.61 11.51 11.58 8.85 4.59 11.28 8.30 5.46 6.72 2.88
06/09 20.64 11.60 9.01 6.82 2.20 9.41 4.67 3.23 4.48 0.28
06/10 21.47 13.06 10.87 9.24 4.23 11.80 7.24 5.31 6.93 2.32
06/11 22.75 12.28 10.25 9.66 4.68 12.02 7.30 5.54 7.64 2.75
06/12 23.97 12.13 11.00 9.81 5.06 11.88 6.85 5.74 8.27 2.87
07/01 22.48 12.4 10.30 8.71 3.94 11.34 6.02 4.65 6.90 1.89
07/02 23.08 12.01 10.29 8.74 3.99 11.29 6.41 4.57 6.90 1.99
07/03 22.74 13.63 10.35 9.15 4.58 11.44 7.23 4.76 7.37 2.39
07/04 23.42 14.41 10.97 9.42 4.86 11.61 6.60 5.32 7.38 2.72
07/05 21.89 11.83 10.49 9.08 4.61 11.34 6.29 4.92 6.55 2.57
07/06 22.93 13.21 10.85 9.45 5.17 11.66 6.94 5.41 7.42 3.14
07/07 21.65 13.76 11.21 9.69 5.58 11.59 5.99 6.01 7.34 3.45
07/08 23.32 14.63 11.69 9.76 5.73 11.03 6.60 5.95 7.55 3.83
07/09 22.46 15.30 10.51 8.95 5.20 11.01 6.58 5.36 6.74 3.20
07/10 17.47 8.34 8.56 8.78 5.06 9.16 6.47 4.75 6.43 6.67
07/11 22.34 12.54 9.96 8.97 5.23 9.52 6.11 5.06 6.95 4.74
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Table B.3: Averages of Branch Network Sizes (A) and Branch Network Ex-
pansion Choices (B).
Yr A B Yr A B Yr A B Yr A B
04 05 06 07
J 148.8 0 J 166 0.60 J 172.4 0.40 J 185 0.80
F 148.8 0.20 F 166.6 0.20 F 172.8 0 F 185.8 0.40
M 149 0.20 M 166.8 −0.40 M 172.8 1.40 M 186.2 0.60
A 149.2 −0.20 A 166.4 −0.20 A 174.2 1.20 A 186.8 0
M 149 0.20 M 166.2 −0.40 M 175.2 1.20 M 186.8 0.60
J 149.2 1.60 J 165.8 0.40 J 176.6 1.20 J 187.4 0.80
J 154.2 1.60 J 166.2 0.80 J 177.8 1.40 J 188.2 0.20
A 159 1.60 A 167 0.40 A 179.2 1.20 A 188.4 0.80
S 164 0.80 S 167.4 1.80 S 180.4 1.40 S 189.2 0.80
O 164.8 0.20 O 169.2 1.40 O 181.8 1.40 O 190.4 0.40
N 165 0.80 N 170.6 1.80 N 183.2 1.40 N 190.4 0
D 165.8 0.20 D 172.4 0 D 184.6 0.40
Table B.4: Summary of Model Variables and Empirical Measures.
Variable Name Note Empirical Measure
Retail Loan Rate rhl Monthly Bank Rate
Retail Deposit Rate rhd Monthly Bank Rate
Firm Loan Rate rcl Monthly Market-Average Rate
Own Branch Network n j Monthly Bank Network Size
Hhold’s Discount Factor βh N/A
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Table B.4: (Continued)
Variable Name Note Empirical Measure
Firm’s Discount Factor βc N/A
Total Number of Branches N Monthly total Branch Network
Per-capita Income I Monthly Per-capita Income
Total Deposit Supply Dh Monthly Aggregate Sum
Total Retail Loan Demand Lh Monthly Aggregate Sum
Total Firm Loan Demand Lc Monthly Aggregate Sum
Retail per-capita Savings sh N/A
Retail per-capita Loan & Firm Loan
(
lh; lc
)
N/A
Retail per-capita Deposits dh N/A
Total Number of Firms F N/A
Required Reserve Ratio φ Monthly RRR from MNB
Interbank Rate r˜ Monthly Interbank Rate
Hhold Distance to branch x N/A
Per-capita Lifetime Consumption C N/A
Firm’s Capital Input k N/A
Proportional Costs
(
chl ; c
h
d
)
Estimated from TVC equation(
cn; ccl
)
Entry Costs & Scrap Value ( f ; e) Estimated from Model
Branch Network Expansion a j Change in Network Size
State & Structural Variables (Θ;Ξ) N/A
Firm’s Variable & Total Profit (pi;Π) Functional Forms as in Model
Firm Output & Equity (y, b) N/A
Private Shock  j Draws from Std. Normal Dist.
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Figure B.1: Lending Rates Adjusted for Currency Appreciation and Infla-
tion.
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Figure B.2: Deposit Rates Adjusted for Currency Appreciation and Infla-
tion.
129
Aug2003 Feb2004 Sep2004 Mar2005 Oct2005 May2006 Nov2006 Jun2007 Dec2007−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Time Period
N
um
be
r o
f N
ew
 B
ra
nc
he
s
 
 
Avg. Number of
New Bank Branches
Figure B.3: Average Expansion of Branch Network Size Over Time.
B.3 Simulation Exercises
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Figure B.4: Branch Network Size and Increases in Branch Setup Costs.
130
Feb2004 Sep2004 Mar2005 Oct2005 May2006 Nov2006 Jun2007 Dec20078.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
8.8
8.9
Time Period
N
et
 In
te
re
st
 In
co
m
e 
(Lo
g o
f M
illio
n H
UF
)
 
 
Log of Avg. Net Interest
Income
Log of Avg. NII with 100%
Initial Income Increase
Figure B.5: Net Interest Income and Increases in Per Capita Consumer In-
come.
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Figure B.6: Branch Network Size and Increases in Per Capita Consumer
Income.
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Figure B.7: Retail Lending Rates and Increases in Per Capita Consumer
Income.
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Figure B.8: Deposit Rates and Increases in Per Capita Consumer Income.
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Figure B.9: Mortgage Rates and Increases in Per Capita Consumer Income.
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Figure B.10: Net Interest Income and Increases in Competitors’ Branch
Network Size.
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Figure B.11: Branch Network Size and Increases in Competitors’ Branch
Network Size.
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Figure B.12: Retail Lending Rates and Increases in Competitors’ Branch
Network Size.
134
Feb2004 Sep2004 Mar2005 Oct2005 May2006 Nov2006 Jun2007 Dec20072.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4
Time Period
D
ep
os
it 
Ra
te
 
 
Avg. Deposit Rates
Avg. Deposit Rates at Double Initial
Initial Competitors’ Branch Network Size
Figure B.13: Deposit Rates and Increases in Competitors’ Branch Network
Size.
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Figure B.14: Mortgage Rates and Increases in Competitors’ Branch Net-
work Size.
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